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Bulk Power Risk Analysis: Ranking Infrastructure Elements
According to their Risk Significance
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Science and Engineering
Abstract
Disruptions in the bulk power grid can result in very diverse consequences that
include economic, social, physical, and psychological impacts. In addition, power
outages do not affect all end-users of the system in the same manner. For these reasons, a
risk analysis of bulk power systems requires more than determining the likelihood and
magnitude of power outages; it must also include the diverse impacts power outages have
on the users of the system.
We propose a methodology for performing a risk analysis on the bulk power
system. A power flow simulation model is used to determine the likelihood and extent of
power outages when components within the system fail to perform their designed
function. The consequences associated with these failures are determined by looking at
the type and number of customers affected. Stakeholder input is used to evaluate the
relative importance of these consequences. The methodology culminates with a ranking
of each system component by its risk significance to the stakeholders. The analysis is
performed for failures of infrastructure elements due to both random causes and
malevolent acts.
Thesis Supervisor: George E. Apostolakis
Title: Professor of Nuclear Science and Engineering and Engineering Systems
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Chapter 1 - Introduction
1. Introduction
The electrical supply system in North America including the United States,
Canada, and a small portion of Northern Baja, Mexico, can be viewed as consisting of
three parts. These are the generation of electrical power, the transmission of electricity,
and the distribution of electricity to the end-users. The bulk power system is the
generation and transmission portion of the system. The term 'bulk' refers to the large
amounts of electrical power before it is distributed to the end-users [1].
The bulk power grid is an international system that is divided into three major
regions. These regions are known as the NERC (North American Electric Reliability
Council) Interconnections: the Eastern Interconnection; the Western Interconnection; and
the ERCOT (Electric Reliability Council of Texas) Interconnection. The Eastern
Interconnection services the U.S. states and Canadian provinces east of, and including,
the great plane region. The Western Interconnection provides power to states and
provinces west of, and including, the Rocky Mountain area. The smallest
interconnection, ERCOT Interconnection, covers the majority of Texas. These
interconnections exhibit strong connectivity within themselves but are only weakly
connected to each other.
NERC was established in 1968 in response to the 1965 Northeast Blackout.
NERC is a non-government agency in the United States and Canada that sets guidelines
for the reliable and safe operation of the bulk power grid. NERC has no authority to
impose its recommendations but, rather, relies on the common good and self-interest of
its members for adherence to its guidelines [2,3].
Besides NERC, there are other stakeholders involved with the bulk power system.
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) is one of these stakeholders.
FERC, besides regulating other energy infrastructures, regulates the transmission and
hydro production of electricity in the United States [4]. FERC, as an independent federal
agency, has the authority to enforce its regulations through civil penalties. FERC is
currently promoting the voluntary formation of Regional Transmission Organizations
(RTOs, also known as Independent System Operators, ISOs) that oversee the entire
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transmission capabilities in the United States [5]. Currently, there are 11 RTOs that
operate the transmission lines in most states. RTOs operate transmission grids to
maintain continuity of service between generation companies and the customers. They
are also responsible to ensure nondiscriminatory access to the bulk power grid and are
involved with the coordination of planned outages between multiple sites. Beside these
bulk power grid stakeholders, there are also the electric utility companies themselves.
Electric utility companies include publicly traded companies, federal and state agencies,
rural cooperatives, and independent energy providers.
Many end-user groups constitute the customers of the bulk power system making
it an equally diverse group. These users include individual citizens, manufacturers,
financial networks, communication companies, transportation networks, medical
facilities, government agencies, and gas and water supply infrastructures. Electric power
supports almost every aspect of our lives everyday, either directly or indirectly, and has
become an integral part of our national security and economy.
In light of recent events, such as the 2003 Northeast Blackout, and the prevalent
dependencies on electric power, it is recognized that a large disruption in the bulk power
system, either due to random events or intentional attacks, may result in widespread
consequences. These consequences could include economic, social, physical, and
psychological impacts. The blackout of the Northeast on August 14, 2003, that affected
over 50 million people, has been estimated to have had an economic impact between $4
billion and $10 billion in the United States alone [6].
There is a large amount of literature that analyzes failures in the bulk power
system as they impact the economy. Zimmerman et al. [7] have developed a
methodology that employs the economic accounting concept. The methodology uses cost
factors to assign a monetary value to the consequences (loss of life, business losses, and
loss of services) that may result from terrorist attacks on the bulk power system. The
authors then combine these dollar values into a single measure, the economic impact,
which is used to evaluate the risk terrorist attacks pose to the power grid. Greenburg [8]
illustrates the use of this methodology by developing a terrorist attack scenario on the
September 2006Anthony Koonce NSE
Chapter 1 - Introduction
New Jersey electric power supply network and then evaluates the impacts on the New
Jersey economy. The economic impacts of the August 14, 2003 Northeast Blackout as
stated in Reference 6 were also based on economist evaluations of metrics that included
spoilage of perishable goods, cost of power not provided, lost productivity, disposal of
goods in production during power outage, extra wages for employees, and equipment
restart expenses. As stated earlier, there are various types of impacts (social, physical,
and psychological) that accompany economic impacts with failures in the bulk power
grid, some of which may be socially unacceptable to be assigned a dollar 'cost.'
Analysis of past blackout data [9] show that outages and disturbances follow a
power law distribution with a tail that shows that larger blackout frequencies decrease as
a power function of its size. This is contrary to the previous belief that the frequencies of
major blackouts decreased exponentially. Chen et al [10] confirm this distribution, and
its tail, by analyzing NERC data of power outages that date back to 1984. Carreras et al
[11] further investigate this distribution of blackout sizes by looking for critical loading
points in electric power systems. They present an electric power transmission model that
represents loads and generators as nodes of a network and use linear programming to
analyze the network. Load shedding is observed as the load demand of the system is
increased and the capacity of supply is held constant. This study shows that there are two
transitions that define a critical loading that greatly increases the risk of major blackouts.
One transition occurs when the load demand overcomes the total capacity of generation.
A second transition occurs when load demand causes the transmission lines to become
overloaded. Criticality of electric transmission systems was verified by Nedic et al. [12]
using AC power modeling.
There are also works that look at 'hardening' effects of the bulk power grid
against terrorist attacks. Salmeron et al. [13] use non-linear programming to construct a
power flow model that establishes the load flow of an electric power grid system. Lines
are then attacked, or removed from service, and the power flow model is used to
reestablish a stable configuration with portions of the system's load not served. The
effects on the system are tracked as multiple lines are removed from service. These
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results are used to find the optimal applications of available resources to harden the
system and minimize the effects of terrorist action. Bier et al [14] introduce a linear
programming algorithm that also solves this optimization problem of applying available
resources to the power grid with similar results as the previous work.
Engineers at the Duke Power Company have proposed a value-based approach to
investment planning regarding upgrades to the power system [15]. Their methodology
looks at the expected cost of proposed improvements and the expected cost to customers
of future outages without this improvement. They combine the customer cost and
investment cost to determine the minimal value over a time period using discounting of
future costs. The lowest value of the combined cost determines the appropriate time to
make the improvement to the transmission system. To do this, the engineers look at the
likelihood of future outages, the possible effects of these outages, and the cost imposed
onto the customers if these outages occur. This work looks at the direct economic impact
to customers that result from power outages but not the social, physical, and
psychological impacts.
This thesis focuses on analyzing the risks associated with the bulk power system
using the viewpoint of an electric utility company. Section 2 summarizes past work on
risk assessment which is the basis for the methodology developed and applied to the bulk
power grid in Section 3. Section 4 offers a discussion of the results and, finally, Section
5 offers a number of concluding remarks. A series of appendices show the results of the
calculations.
Anthony Koonce NSE 
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2. Risk Assessment
2.1 Overview
There are three components that make up risk in a technological system. These
are the sequences of failures that can lead to undesirable consequences, their likelihood of
occurrence, and the consequences that accompany these failures. This triplet definition
of risk was proposed by Kaplan and Garrick [16] when they defined risk as the answers
to the following three questions:
* What can happen?
* How likely is it to occur?
* What are the consequences?
There are methods, such as Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA; also called
Quantitative Risk Assessment - QRA), for answering these three questions in complex
but well defined systems such as nuclear power stations, chemical processing plants, and
space systems [17]. For large, national infrastructures, these methods need to be adapted
to the infrastructure's technological and sociopolitical complexities [18]. Garrick et al
[19] outline a possible application of PRA techniques in the analysis of infrastructures.
They point out that the full application of these techniques requires the development of
processes by which private and government bodies will be able to share data freely. The
difficulty in applying these methods to the risk assessment of infrastructures is further
exacerbated when terrorism or malevolent acts are to be considered due to problems with
determining the likelihood of a successful attack. The assessment of the likelihood that a
terrorist attack will occur requires information on the intent, capability, and resources to
carry out the attack. Given that a group possesses these traits, determining the point, or
points, of attack requires knowledge of the goals, beliefs, and desires of the group. The
probability of the attack being successful depends upon the quality of countermeasures in
place to deter or combat the attack [20]. For these reasons, the MIT methodology (to be
described shortly) assumes threats of appropriate levels for the analysis and leaves the
likelihood of attack to the agencies responsible for collecting intelligence (Ref. 18). The
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risk assessment of infrastructures presents additional difficulties due to their diffuse
nature.
To answer the fist two risk questions when dealing with infrastructures, the ideas
of vulnerabilities and threats are used. Haimes [21] defines these two terms as follows:
"Vulnerability is the manifestation of the inherent states of the system (e.g.
physical, technical, organizational, cultural) that can be exploited to adversely
affect (cause harm or damage to) that system."
"Threat is the intent and capability to adversely affect (cause harm or damage to)
the system by adversely changing its states."
We adopt these definitions in this thesis.
2.2 The MIT Methodology
Apostolakis and Lemon (Ref. 18) develop a screening methodology for diffuse
infrastructures and rank vulnerabilities to terrorism. The authors apply their methodology
to the water, electric power, and gas distribution systems on the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology (MIT) campus. The methodology requires the stakeholders to determine
the importance of possible consequences that may result from successful attacks on these
infrastructures. These consequences include impacts on public image, Institute
operations, economics, health, safety, and the environment. The stakeholder group in this
work is a multidisciplinary team that includes decision makers of the MIT Department of
Facilities with expertise in finance, utility operations, and space planning [22].
The stakeholder input is used to create a value tree that reflects the stakeholders'
views. A minimal cut set (mcs) approach is used to identify and analyze vulnerabilities
in the infrastructures. The consequences resulting from successful attack on the
vulnerabilities are then applied to the value tree to determine the stakeholder impact
(value) each vulnerability represents. Apostolakis and Lemon point out that determining
the likelihood of a terrorist attack is very difficult to determine and is best left to the
security and intelligence agencies. Their work assumes a "minor" level of threat to be
present. The work then determines the susceptibility of each mcs to this level of threat by
September 2006Anthony Koonce NSE
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looking at its accessibility and security measures. The susceptibility of each mcs is then
combined with its value for ranking. The result is a ranking that requires a mcs to have
both a high susceptibility and a high value to be placed higher in the ranking.
Michaud and Apostolakis [23] expand the methodology developed by Apostolakis
and Lemon by analyzing a water supply network for an entire city. The authors use
network theory and component capacity to analyze the water supply infrastructure rather
than the mcs approached proposed in Reference 18. Michaud and Apostolakis also
expand the methodology by including the duration of system failures in their analysis to
capture the time dependence of the consequences resulting from failures in the
infrastructure. These authors do not look only at terrorist acts on the infrastructure but
split the threats to the system into mechanical (random) failures and malevolent acts.
This allows the analysis to determine the risk within the infrastructure due to random
failures and the risk due to terrorist attack that is conditional on the assumed threat level.
Patterson and Apostolakis [24] further develop the MIT ranking methodology by
identifying critical locations within multiple overlapping infrastructures. They apply the
methodology to the chilled water supply, domestic water supply, steam supply, natural
gas, and electric power infrastructures on the MIT campus. The authors employ the
Geographic Information System (GIS) to determine the geographical layout of each
infrastructure. GIS also provides extensive data on the infrastructure user groups
identified within the work. Due to the larger number of infrastructures and users
included in the analysis, the authors use Monte Carlo simulation and importance measure
concepts for the analysis of each infrastructure. The authors borrow the concept of
importance measures from PRA [25] and they generalize it to include the stakeholder
values. Each infrastructure is analyzed independently to assign to each location a value
of the new importance measure the authors call Geographic Valued Worth (GVW). Once
each infrastructure is analyzed, the GVWs from each infrastructure for a given location
are summed to determine the location's overall GVW. These GVWs are used to rank the
various locations.
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The next section describes the MIT methodology, as it applies to the bulk power
grid, in detail. Detail of the grid and customer groups used in the work are also provided.
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3. Methodology
3.1 Overview
The MIT risk ranking methodology is a systematic process to analyze failures in
an infrastructure and rank them according to their impacts on the stakeholders. The work
presented in this paper is an application to the bulk power grid of the methodology
developed in References 18, 23, and 24. The stakeholders used in this presentation are
five members of an electric utility company. Figure 1 illustrates the methodology.
Although details will be provided later, a brief overview is given here.
Figure 1: Methodology overview.
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The methodology begins by identifying assets and components of the bulk power
infrastructure that will be included in the analysis. Analysis of the infrastructure is then
preformed, using the Sandia AC load flow simulation model [26], to determine the
physical consequences resulting from the failure of the components. These consequences
include the number and type of customers affected, and the duration of the power
outages. These consequences are input to a value tree that incorporates the stakeholders'
views of possible impacts. The value tree is then used to determine the impact the
consequences have on these stakeholders. The amount of impact a component represents
to the stakeholder is its value. Each component value is then combined with its
susceptibility to failure or attack. The combination of value and susceptibility is then
used to rank the components according to their risk significance. The following
subsections describe the process of this methodology in detail.
3.2 Infrastructure Elements
The IEEE 1996 Reliability Test System (RTS-96) [27] is a test grid that has been
established to evaluate bulk power reliability analysis techniques. The system does not
resemble any portion of the North American power grid but has been developed to
provide a universal standard that could be used for diverse applications (Ref. 27). The
single area RTS-96 is used as the study grid for our application.
The single area RTS-96 grid (Figure 2) contains 24 buses and 38 transmission
lines. The buses consist of 9 load only buses, 8 load/generation buses, 3 generation only
buses, and 4 transmission buses (no load or generation on the bus). Reference 27
provides data for generators, buses, and transmission lines that include capacities, failure
rates and probabilities, mean times to repair/failure (MTTR/MTTF), and line lengths.
However, there are no established customers associated with the RTS-96 grid. This
requires that an artificial customer load be created and placed on the grid for our work.
Anthony Koonce NSE September 
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Figure 2: Single area IEEE RTS-96 grid (Ref. 27).
We introduce four customer groups: Residential customers, Commercial
customers, Small - Medium Industrial customers, and Large Industrial customers. These
customer groups were selected based on Edison Electric Institute [28], which identifies
the customer groups as Residential, Commercial, and Industrial. The Industrial customer
group was split into two groups, small - medium and large, so that the differences
between these customer types could be included in the analysis, e.g., the impact due to
down time, equipment re-start time, and the loss of product that results from power
interruptions as discussed in the IEEE Gold Book [29].
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Customers for each customer group were placed on each load bus using national
average usage data (Ref. 28) and the load history for the system (Ref. 27). These
customers were added to each group until the load capacity of the RTS-96 was reached.
Table 1 shows the customer loading. To simulate diversity within the grid, the customers
are not placed in the same ratio among the groups on each bus. These customer groups
were developed and applied to the grid prior to the infrastructure analysis. For
application to an actual portion of the North American power grid, an assessment of the
customers on the grid would be required. This assessment could be done using the utility
company's customer data or by surveying the area which the analysis would cover.
Commercial
Customers
(#)
6,200
5,690
6,800
6,000
4,700
5,580
6,850
6,680
6,100
6,259
0
0
8,889
9,650
17,600
4,000
0
18,500
9,600
7,550
0
0
0
0
136,648
Industrial Customers
Small - Medium Large
(#) (#)
375 1
265 0
945 1
355 0
280 0
690 0
395 0
650 5
555 2
825 2
0 0
0 0
945 9
850 10
1,510 34
750 12
0 0
1,680 38
750 5
580 5
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
12,400 124
Table 1: Customer data per bus.
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Bus
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
Total
Load(MW)
108
97
180
74
71
136
125
171
175
195
0
0
265
194
317
100
0
333
181
128
0
0
0
0
2,850
Residential
Customers
(#)
38,680
35,806
83,200
13,920
21,300
60,932
48,470
78,312
89,260
99,890
0
0
131,012
69,910
86,080
32,000
0
87,020
65,440
39,290
0
0
0
0
1,078,800
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The infrastructure elements whose failures will be investigated are the generators,
buses, and transmission lines that make up the bulk power grid. The threats to these
elements include both random failures and malevolent acts. Malevolent acts are the
intentional disruption of the infrastructure by purposely preventing a component from
carrying out its designed operation.
Single-failure scenarios are used as the failure scenarios in the presentation of this
methodology. As for attacks, only minor threats are considered. Minor threats are
threats, such as vandalism or employee sabotage, that have the ability to attack a single
infrastructure asset, but do not possess the ability to attack multiple assets with a
coordinated attack. Even though the failure of multiple components would likely have
larger consequences, the likelihood of multiple failures may decrease drastically, a fact
that would partly offset their importance or value in the ranking process. This single-
component limitation was made in part due to the limitations of the model used to
analyze the power grid at this time and due to the rapidly increasing number of
combinations of simultaneous events. If the present work included an actual portion of
the North American power grid, the investigation of higher-order vulnerabilities would
need to be covered to include coordinated attacks on multiple targets, as well as
concurrent failures of two or more assets.
3.3 Infrastructure Analysis
The infrastructure analysis of the bulk power grid employs an AC load flow
simulation model developed at Sandia National Laboratories (Ref. 26). For input into the
load flow model, the single area RTS-96 is modeled as a network that includes the buses
as nodes and the transmission lines as arcs. Node data include the real and reactive
power generating capacity, the real and reactive power load demand, the customer
loading, and the peak load history for each day in a 52 week year (364 days). Arc data
include the voltage and current capacities (Ref. 27). The load flow model is currently
limited to modeling only one generator per bus. Work is underway to update the
program's generator modeling characteristics and allow for the modeling of multiple
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generators on each bus. The analysis presented in this work combines the total
generating capacity on each bus and treats it as a single generator.
Figure 3: Infrastructure analysis overview.
Figure 3 provides an overview of the infrastructure simulation model.
Infrastructure analysis begins by selecting a system component (generator, transmission
line, or bus) to be failed and the time frame for the analysis. The analysis time frame can
Initialize Fail selected Adjust sy tem
system P component P power flow
power flow
Set system Shed 10% of load E
load to the at buses supplied Evaluate
next day load by affected Voltage transmission linehisoryto low voltageshistory transmission line to low voltages
All
voltages
Yes within
limits
All currents Evaluate
Another day in Produce load shed within limits
time frame? vector transmission linecurrents
Current
No above
limit
Terminate simulation Remove affected
(Load shed vectors are recorded) transmission
lines from
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be any time length between one day and 364 days (the entire load history period). This
allows the analysis of the bulk power grid to be performed using varying seasonal data,
such as the effects of the weather on component failure rates/frequencies and the
consequences resulting from component failures during extreme cold/hot seasons. The
number of days selected in the time frame will be the number of simulations run for the
selected component. Transmission line 4 is selected as the failed component along with a
time frame of 21 days and will serve as the example throughout this section.
The load flow simulation model uses a quasi-steady state step in time to
determine the effects an initial, single-component failure has on the entire infrastructure.
This step in time simulation has the ability to identify components in the grid that
experience conditions outside of their limits, e.g., transmission lines that experience over
current conditions. These components are then tripped off line causing a cascading effect
to be captured. This cascading effect can result in the initial, single-component failure
causing more load shed than a normal stability analysis would conclude.
The power flow model begins by initializing the system with a stable flow for the
first day of the time frame. To do this, the system loading for the day is determined by
the load history data provided in the RTS-96 (Ref. 27). The day's peak load is assumed
to last the entire day. A stable flow is established when the existing load is being
supplied with power from available generators and each transmission line is within its
voltage and current capacities.
Once the system is in a fault-free, stable condition, the selected component is
failed (transmission line 4 for our example). The introduced fault of the selected
component causes a disturbance in the power flow. The simulation model adjusts the
generated power at each generator to attempt to regain a stable flow in response to this
disturbance. Power is adjusted until the generating capacity is reached or the load is met
on each bus, which ever occurs first. The current and voltage on each transmission line is
tracked during this power adjustment.
Any transmission line that has a voltage below its limit requires load to be shed in
order to bring the line voltage within specifications. Load shedding is done in 10%
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increments of the total bus load. This incremental load shed is done to simulate the
segregation of load by the various branches leaving the bus in the distribution system.
This simplifying assumption is made due to the RTS-96 not possessing an established
distribution system that further carries the electric power from the bulk power grid to the
end users. If an actual portion of the North American bulk power system were analyzed,
where the distribution system is identifiable, the increments of load that may be shed at
each bus would be determined by the configuration and priority of each branch in the
distribution system. After each transmission line voltage is verified within its limits, the
current on each line is investigated.
The simulation model identifies the transmission lines that are carrying a current
above its limit. Transmission lines with excessive current will be tripped out of service
and will require additional adjustment to the load flow. Any adjustment to the load flow
will require the transmission line voltages to be reevaluated as in the previous step.
Once a stable load flow has been reestablished, the amount of load shed at each
bus is recorded within a load shed vector and the simulation is repeated for the next day
in the time frame or terminates if the time frame is complete. To complete the analysis of
the components in the system, the entire simulation process is repeated for each
remaining component using the same time frame.
The load shed vector is an N-dimensional vector that represents the effect the
failed component has on the system with N being the number of buses in the grid. N is
24 for the single area RTS-96 grid. Each element of the load shed vector is the
percentage of load at its respective bus that has been shed to regain stability in the
system. The elements that correspond to a transmission bus (no customers present on the
bus) will always be zero. Since the simulation can encompass several days, a separate
load shed vector is produced for each day of the simulation time frame. Our example
time frame is 21 days; therefore, 21 load shed vectors are produced for the failure of
transmission line 4.
The affected component, the number and type of customers affected, and the
duration of the power outages make up the physical consequences of system failures. The
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type and number of customers affected by load shedding is determined by the load shed
vectors. It is assumed for the RTS-96 customer base that the customers on a bus are
evenly dispersed over the distribution system branches (10% increments) of the bus.
That is, if a bus experiences a 20% load shedding during a failure scenario, 20% of each
customer group on that bus will be shed to meet the load shedding requirement. The
duration of the power outage is determined by the failed component. The duration of a
failure scenario is assumed to be the component's mean time to repair (MTTR) or
permanent outage duration time as specified in the RTS-96. For our example,
transmission line 4 is the failed component so the duration of the scenario is 10 hours.
This time equates to the required time to repair the line and is listed as its permanent
outage duration time listed in Reference 27.
As mentioned previously, the time frame selected for the analysis determines the
number of load shed vectors calculated for each component in the system. Due to the
system load history (a different peak load for each day), these load shed vectors for a
single component may vary throughout the time frame. We assume that the load shed
vector that results in the largest amount of load shed is the representative vector for the
component. The customer portion of the physical consequences of losing transmission
line 4 is given in Table 2. The zero elements of the load shed vector are omitted since
there would be no load loss on their associated buses. It is not allowed to shed a portion
of a single customer, for this reason, there are no large industrial customers lost upon
failure of transmission line 4.
Anthony Koonce NSE September 2006t  oonce NSE September 2006
Chapter 3 - Methodology
S - M LargeBus Load Shed Vector Residential CommercialM LargeIndustrial Industrial
2 0.10 3,580 569 26 0
3 0.10 8,320 680 94 0
4 0.10 1,392 600 35 0
6 0.10 6,093 558 69 0
7 0.10 48,470 6850 395 0
Total 67,855 9,257 619 0
Table 2: Customer portion of physical consequences for transmission line 4.
3.4 Value Tree and Constructed Scales
As described in Reference 23, the value tree is based on multi-attribute utility
theory (MAUT) and provides a hierarchical view of the impact each failure scenario may
have on the stakeholders. The value tree consists of three levels in which the top level is
the overall impact, or value, of a failure scenario (Figure 1). The second level breaks this
overall impact into broad categories called impact categories (IC). The ICs are further
reduced in the third level to specific aspects, called performance measures (PM), that
specifically describe the various ways consequences result in impacts to the stakeholders.
Each PM is divided into various levels of impact called the constructed scales (CS). The
levels of the CSs represent the amount of impact the physical consequences have on the
stakeholder through each PM. The levels for each CS range from no impact to complete
impact to the PM.
The value tree is constructed using stakeholder input regarding the ways in which
they may be affected by system failures. This is done by the stakeholders defining the
ICs, PMs, and CS that make up their value tree. Once the value tree is formed, the
stakeholders' view of importance regarding each IC, PM, and CS is modeled. The
importance modeling is done by assessing the stakeholders' beliefs using pairwise
comparisons. These comparisons are then used in calculating the weights for the ICs,
PMs, and each level in the CSs. The IC and PM weights represent their contributions to
the overall impact. The weight of a CS level represents the amount of impact felt by the
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stakeholders when the physical consequences result in that level. Since the impacts felt
by the stakeholders are negative impacts, the amount of impact is referred to as the
disutility.
For each failure scenario, the physical consequences result in a CS level being
impacted for each PM. The PM weights and disutility is then used to determine the
overall impact felt by the stakeholder. The overall impact of a scenario is called its
performance index (PI) and is used in the component ranking process.
The construction of the value tree and its weights used for the present work are
presented here as an example of this methodology. The CSs used in this work are then
discussed followed by an example of the process used to determining the PI of each
failure scenario.
The stakeholders that participated in the construction of the value tree are five
members of a regional electric utility company affiliated with the management and
transmission departments at the company, Table 3. They worked together to form the
value tree in a workshop. Input for the weights associated with the value tree was
provided independently by each member. The input provided by the senior participating
member, referred to as S-1, will be the primary input for this work and is presented as the
example in this section. The input provided by the remaining four members (S-2 through
S-5) will be discussed in the next section and used as a sensitivity analysis on the
application of the methodology.
Member Organization
S-1 Management Division
S-2 Transmission Department
S-3 Transmission Department
S-4 Management Division
S-5 Transmission Department
Table 3: Participating members' affiliation with the electric utility company.
Anthony Koonce NSE September 2006nthony Koonce NSE September 2006
Chapter 3 - Methodology
Figure 1 contains the value tree that represents the consensus of the five
stakeholders (excluding the weights). Economics, Image, Health & Safety, and
Environment were defined as the ICs and were deemed sufficient to encompass all
possible impacts felt by the company following a failure in the power grid. Economics
was divided into Lost Revenue, which accounts for the financial impacts due to power not
supplied during an outage, and Repair/Replace, which is the cost associated with
restoring the failed component. Image defines the impacts to the company's image
following an outage and was split into the company's Political, Public, and Customer
image. Political defines the impact system failures have on the local, state, and federal
authorities which may propose additional regulations on electric generating and
transmission companies. Public refers to the general public's view of and confidence in
the company's ability to provide reliable power. Customer defines the company's
relationship with non-residential customers and is assumed to be directly tied to the
customer's incurred cost due to a power outage. Health & Safety was divided into
General Public and Utility Workers. General Public is meant to account for the effects
on the public when power outages affect medical facilities, emergency response services,
transportation networks, and daily life conveniences such as heating and cooling a home.
Utility Workers accounts for the increased safety concerns of the company regarding its
employees that are responsible for repairing the failed component. Environment was
assigned a single PM which is Fauna. Fauna defines the affect failure scenarios have on
the wildlife in the region with specific consideration to fish population associated Hydro-
Electric generation.
To evaluate the weights present in the value tree, the participating members were
provided surveys in which they performed pairwise comparisons between the ICs. They
first identified which ICs they felt were more important and to what extent. This process
is shown in Figure 4 (using the input provided by S-1). For example, this stakeholder
judges that the IC Health & Safety is equally or slightly more important than the IC
Environment. The same stakeholder believes that the PM General Public is weakly to
moderately more important than the PM Utility Workers with respect to Health & Safety.
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It is very important to point out that the stakeholders have already been informed about
the possible ranges of the consequences and are making their evaluations being fully
aware of these ranges. In the present case, it was the consensus that the potential impacts
of failures on both Health & Safety and the Environment were very small, unless a major
catastrophic event disrupted a majority of the grid. The stakeholder assessments were
made under this assumption.
Figure 4: Survey of stakeholder input.
The stakeholder input is placed into a matrix and the weights are determined
using the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) [30]. Although several methods exist in the
literature for evaluating weights [31], this method was used because the stakeholders find
the pairwise comparisons easier to implement. The AHP results were scrutinized to make
sure they represented the stakeholder views.
The CSs used for this work are presented in Table 4 - Table 7. AHP is also used
for the determination of the disutility for each level of the CSs. Disutility is a
Instructions:
1. Compare the two items listed; circle the item that you feel is the most important.
2. Indicate how much more important the circled item is using the scale provided:
1 - equally 3 - weakly 5 - moderately 7 - strongly 9 - extremely
Use even numbers to indicate importance between these increments.
Impact Categories Economics:
1. Economic vs.4 Q 4 1(i Relven s. Repairs 6
Ks. Health & Safety 2 Image:
(iavs. Health & Safety 2 1. Public vs 4
4. Environment vsEconomic 2. Public v(i6
5. Environment v S 2 3. Customers vso 6
6. Environment vs( 4
Health & Safety:
1~us. Utility Worker 4
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monotonically non-decreasing function that defines the amount of impact a level in the
CS has on its PM. For this reason, the disutilities in each CS range from no impact
(0.0000) to complete impact (1.0000) of the PM.
Economics
Lost Revenue:
Level Constructed Scale Disutility eightedDisutility
6 Hundreds of Millions of Dollars 1.0000 0.2092
5 Tens of Millions of Dollars 0.5409 0.1132
4 Millions of Dollars 0.3684 0.0771
3 Hundreds of Thousands of Dollars 0.1761 0.0368
2 Tens of Thousands of Dollars 0.0687 0.0144
1 Thousands of Dollars 0.0332 0.0069
0 No Impact 0.0000 0.0000
Repairs/Replace:
Level Constructed Scale Disutility WeightedDisutility
6 Hundreds of Millions of Dollars 1.0000 0.0349
5 Tens of Millions of Dollars 0.5409 0.0189
4 Millions of Dollars 0.3684 0.0129
3 Hundreds of Thousands of Dollars 0.1761 0.0061
2 Tens of Thousands of Dollars 0.0687 0.0024
1 Thousands of Dollars 0.0332 0.0012
0 No Impact 0.0000 0.0000
Table 4: Constructed scales for Economics performance measures.
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Image
Public:
WeightedLevel Constructed Scale Disutility WeightedDisutility
4 International media interest 1.0000 0.0388
3 Repeated publications in national media 0.4862 0.0189
2 Repeated publications in local media, appearance in 0.1873 0.0073
national media
1 Single appearance in local media 0.0501 0.0019
0 No Impact 0.0000 0.0000
Political:
WeightedLevel Constructed Scale Disutility i tDisutility
3 Political push for major regulation reform 1.0000 0.3693
2 Moderate political push for additional regulations 0.3606 0.1332
1 Low political influence on industry regulations 0.1604 0.0592
0 No Impact 0.0000 0.0000
Customer:
Level Constructed Scale Disutility eightedDisutility
5 Billions of Dollars 1.0000 0.0977
4 Hundreds of Millions of Dollars 0.5069 0.0495
3 Tens of Millions of Dollars 0.3317 0.0324
2 Millions of Dollars 0.1492 0.0146
1 Hundreds of Thousands of Dollars 0.0566 0.0055
0 No Impact 0.0000 0.0000
Table 5: Constructed scales for Image Performance Measures.
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Health & Safety
General Public:
Level Constructed Scale Disutility WeightedDisutility
5 Numerous deaths contributed to power outage 1.0000 0.0333
4 Few deaths contributed to power outage 0.5069 0.0169
3 Numerous long-term injuries related to power 0.2460 0.0082
outage
2 Few long-term injuries / numerous short-term 0.1087 0.0036
injuries related to power outage
1 Few Short-term injuries related to power outage 0.0370 0.0012
0 No Impact 0.0000 0.0000
Utility Workers:
WeightedLevel Constructed Scale Disutility i tDisutility
3 High safety impact on worker associated with 1.0000 0.1334
repairs
2 Moderate safety impact on worker associated with 0.4358 0.0581
repairs
1 Low safety impact on worker associated with repairs 0.0707 0.0094
0 No Impact 0.0000 0.0000
Table 6: Constructed scales for Health & Safety performance measures.
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Environment
Fauna:
WeightedLevel Constructed Scale Disutility WeightedDisutility
3 Extensive impact on wildlife, decades required for 1.0000 0.0834full recovery
2 Moderate impact on wildlife, few years required for 0.2842 0.0237full recovery
1 Minor impact on wildlife, recovers quickly with no 0.0686 0.0057lingering impacts
0 No Impact 0.0000 0.0000
Table 7: Constructed scales for Environment performance measures.
To determine the level in which physical consequences impact the stakeholders,
the physical consequences are mapped onto the CSs of each PM. The mapping technique
used is determined as shown in Table 8. Sum means that the effects on each customer
group are determined and then summed to determine the level of impact. The
consequence matrix follows the approach presented in Reference 21 where the effects on
each customer group are determined and then the customer group that results in the
highest level of impact is chosen as the representative group for the PM. Component
specific means that the level of impact is determined solely by the failed component in
the failure scenario. Inspection means that the effects a failure scenario has on the
infrastructure itself and not the customers is used to determine the level of impact. An
example of each mapping technique is presented here using our example failure scenario
(transmission line 4, 21 day time frame) to help clarify the process.
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IC PM Mapping Technique
Economic Lost Revenue Sum
Repair/Replace Component Specific
Public Consequence Matrix
Image Political Consequence Matrix
Customers Consequence Matrix
Health & General Public Consequence Matrix
Safety Utility Worker Component Specific
Environment Fauna Inspection
Table 8: PM mapping techniques.
Sum is only used by the Lost Revenue PM. Each customer group has an
associated average energy consumption (kWh) and rate charged per unit of energy
consumed ($/kWh). The physical consequences give us the number of customers in each
group that is affected and the duration of the outage. Using this information we have:
$= [(N i) (Ri) -i i)](T (1)
i=l
where;
$ is the resulting lost revenue
n is the number of customer groups included in the analysis (four in our case)
Ni is the number of customers in group i
Ri is the rate charged to a customer in group i
Ui is the average electric power usage for a single customer in group i
T is the duration of the scenario
The lost revenue for our example is $140,525. This results in transmission line 4 being
placed in level 3 for Lost Revenue which has a disutility of 0.1761 to the stakeholder
(Table 4).
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The mapping technique "Component Specific" (Table 8) will be illustrated using
the Repair/Replace PM. The cost to restore a failed component depends on the
component itself and the way the component failed. The component may be able to be
repaired or might be required to be replaced, depending on the level of damage to the
component. The cost should include the price of repair parts as well as the cost of
equipment used and wages paid due to the man-hours required to restore the component.
Company historical data may also be used to evaluate the average cost to restore a type of
component and to determine its impact. Here, we assume that the cost to restore a
transmission line does not exceed $50,000 but is no less than $10,000. This assumption
is based on the required cost to repair a transmission line by looking at the labor of the
worker, equipment operation cost, and material cost associated with the repairs. This
puts transmission line 4 into level 2 for Repair/Replace which has a disutility of 0.0687 to
the stakeholder.
The consequence matrix requires the construction of a matrix that relates the
duration and number of customers affected by a failure scenario to the CS. This is done
by evaluating the response of the customer groups to past power outages of various sizes
and durations. We use discrete estimates of magnitude and duration of the physical
consequences to determine the expected impact level for the CS. The consequence
matrix for the Customer PM is provided in Table 9 for our example. The physical
consequences for transmission line 4 (Table 2) lead to a level 3 impact based on
Commercial, a level 3 based on S-M Industrial, and a level 0 based on Large Industrial.
Since the maximum level among all groups is a level 3 impact, transmission line 4 is put
into level 3 with a 0.3317 disutility to the stakeholder (Table 5).
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Commercial S - M Industrial Large Industrial
v Duration:
10 hours 1 day I week 10 hours I day 1 week 10 hours 1 day 1 week
5 100,000 50,000 30,000 N/A N/A 4,000 N/A N/A N/A
4 10,000 5,000 3,000 3,000 2,000 400 N/A N/A N/A
3 1,000 500 300 300 200 40 N/A 100 200
" 2 100 50 30 30 20 4 15 10 1
U 1 10 5 3 3 2 1 2 1 N/A
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 9: Consequence matrix for Customer PM
The mapping technique "Inspection" is used only in the Fauna PM and is focused
on the effects caused during power production increases at Hydro-Electric facilities that
result in an impact on the local fish population. As power is increased at the Hydro-
Electric generator, more water is forced through the generating house which results in
less water that is allowed to bypass. Affecting this ratio of power production and bypass
flow has effects on the fish population in the river. For this reason, the amount of power
increase at these facilities and the duration of this power increase are the factors that
affect this PM. Since the output of the simulation model (load shed vectors) does not
give the increase in power production at each generation location, this information is
determined through inspection. The difference between the amount of load shed and
generation disconnected from the grid during a failure scenario is used to determine the
increase demand placed on the generators remaining connected to the grid. It is also
assumed that any increase in demand will be shared among the remaining generators.
This difference in the amount of generation disconnected and load shed is used to create a
unique consequence matrix for this PM and is presented in Table 10. The values in this
matrix represent the amount of excess load that will be placed onto the remaining
generators, including the Hydro-Electric facilities. If a failure scenario results in more
load shed than generation disconnected, or if the hydro plants are disconnected from the
grid, the effect on the Fauna PM is evaluated at a level 0. Transmission line 4 results in a
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generation lost to load shed of -174 MW which results in a level 0 impact with a 0.0000
disutility to the stakeholder.
Generation Lost - Load Shed (MW)
0 Duration:
10 hours 1 day I week
3 N/A N/A 5000
= 2 1,00 1,000 500
4 1 500 500 100
0 0 0 0
Table 10: Matrix for Fauna PM.
To determine the performance index (PI) of a failure scenario, we use Equation 2
(Ref. 18)
KpM
PIj = widij (2)
i=1
where
PIj is the performance index of failure scenario j
wi is the weight of performance measure i
dij is the disutility of performance measure i and failure scenario j
KpM is the total number of performance measures
Table 11 gives an overview of the level of impact to each PM along with the PM weights
for our example failure scenario (stakeholder S-1). Using the disutilities, PM weights for
S-1, and equation 2, the resulting PI for transmission line 4 is 0.0884. This PI represents
the value transmission line 4 has to S-1.
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PM Level of WeightedPM DisutilityWeight Impact Disutility
Lost Revenue 0.2092 3 0.1761 0.0368
Repair / Replace 0.0349 2 0.0687 0.0024
Public 0.0388 2 0.1873 0.0073
Political 0.3693 0 0.0000 0.0000
Customer 0.0977 3 0.3317 0.0324
General Public 0.0333 0 0.0000 0.0000
Utility Worker 0.1334 1 0.0707 0.0094
Fauna 0.0834 0 0.0000 0.0000
Table 11: Impacts to each PM for transmission line 4.
3.5 Ranking
The work presented up to this point has been focused on determining the value of
failure scenarios in the bulk power grid. So far, the first and third questions of risk
assessment have been answered. The second question (likelihood) remains to be
addressed.
To review before we continue, there were two types of threats addressed by this
methodology, random events and minor malevolent acts. As discussed earlier, while the
likelihood of random events is determined by the scenario frequency, the likelihood of
malevolent acts is not addressed by this methodology but, rather, the susceptibility to an
assumed threat is evaluated (Ref. 18).
For random failures, the frequency of a failure scenario is multiplied by the
scenario's value to determine the expected disutility to the stakeholder. As described in
Reference 23, the random failures of the infrastructure elements are then ranked
according to their expected disutility.
For malevolent acts, we follow the approach proposed in Reference 18. The
"susceptibility" of a component is judged subjectively by accessing the quality of security
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measures and openness of the component. Reference 18 proposes six levels of
susceptibility to malevolent acts ranging from completely secure (the lowest level) to
completely open (the highest level). These susceptibility levels are given in Table 12.
Level Description
5 - Extreme
4 - High
3 - Moderate
2 - Low
1 - Very Low
0 - Zero
Completely open, no controls, no barriers
Unlocked, non-complex barriers (door or access panel)
Complex barrier, security patrols, video surveillance
Secure area, locked, complex closure
Guarded, secure area, locked, alarmed, complex closure
Completely secure, inaccessible
Table 12: Susceptibility levels of infrastructure assets.
As proposed in Referencel8, each component's PI and susceptibility are
combined in order to assign the component to a vulnerability category. This process is
illustrated in Table 13. The vulnerability categories are shown in Table 14.
Susceptibility Levels
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Table 13: Susceptibility and value combinations for each vulnerability category.
Susceptibility Levels
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VulnerabilityCategory DescriptionCategory
Red This category represents a severe vulnerability in the infrastructure.
It is reserved for the most critical locations that are highly
susceptible to attack. Red vulnerabilities are those requiring the
most immediate attention.
Orange This category represents the second priority for counter-terrorism
efforts. These locations are generally moderate to extreme
valuable and moderately to extreme susceptible.
Yellow This category represents the third priority for counter terrorism
efforts. These locations are normally less vulnerable because
they are either less susceptible or less valuable than the terrorist
desire.
Blue This category represents the fourth priority for counter terrorism
efforts.
Green This is the final category for action. It gathers all locations not
included in the more severe cases, typically those that are low
(and below) on the susceptibility scale and low (and below) on
the value scale. It is recognized that constrained fiscal resources
is likely to limit efforts in this category, but it should not be
ignored.
Table 14: Infrastructure asset vulnerability categories for ranking element failures due to malevolent
acts.
The present work assesses transmission lines to have an extreme susceptibility
(level 5) due to their openness and remote locations. Buses are assessed to have
moderate susceptibility (level 3) due to safety fences and possible video surveillance.
Generators are usually located at facilities with security forces and high authorized
personnel traffic. For this reason, generators are assessed to have a very low
susceptibility (level 1).
Anthony Koonce NSE 
September 2006September 2006NSEce
Chapter 3 - Methodology
To complete our example of the failure of transmission line 4, its random failure
frequency is 0.39 outages/year. Multiplying this frequency with its PI, we calculate the
expected performance index for this transmission line to be 0.03448.
The susceptibility category for transmission lines is extreme and transmission line
4 possesses a moderate PI (0.0884), which results in the line being assigned to the Orange
category for vulnerabilities (Table 14).
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4. Discussion
4.1 Stakeholder S-1
The input provided by stakeholder S-1 is used to determine the baseline results for
the RTS-96 single area grid. S-1 valued Economics and Image as the most important
impact categories and this resulted in the Lost Revenue, Political Image, and Customer
Image performance measures being the dominant contributors to the overall value of each
failure scenario. The top ten components ranked by their risk significance with respect to
malevolent acts and random events are provided in Table 15 and Table 16, respectively.
An in depth look at the results for the vulnerability rankings showed that there
were two major reasons for T-16 and T-17 being placed at the top of the list. These
transmission lines connect the upper portion of the grid, where the majority of the
generation is located, to the lower portion of the grid. When these lines fail, they limit
the amount of power that can be transmitted to the lower portion of the grid causing the
transmission lines in the lower portion of the grid to become stressed by increasing their
loading. This increased loading results in transmission line T-5 becoming overloaded
which then trips and increases the scenario's impact on bus 6. This results in a large
number of customers being shed. Transmission lines T-16 and T-17 also have extremely
long power outage durations due to their long repair times. This combination of duration
and magnitude causes a high level impact to both Political Image and Lost Revenue.
Another interesting result of the vulnerability ranking for S-1 is that the amount of
load shed alone does not determine the order in which the components are ranked. This
observation is illustrated by the components ranked #6 through #10. The last two
components of the ranking, B-3 and B-4, result in very large load sheds. However, T-14,
T-15, and T-13 result in less load shed but are ranked higher. This is due to the
transmission lines having a much longer duration associated with them. The duration is
the key factor here that elevates their impacts to stakeholder S-1.
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Average Load Susceptibility Vulnerability
Shed (MW) Level Level
1 T-16 734 0.4021 5 - Extreme I (Red)
2 T-17 850 0.4021 5 - Extreme I (Red)
3 T-7 218 0.2583 5 - Extreme I (Red)
4 B-17 1252 0.2246 3 - Moderate II (Orange)
5 B-20 1385 0.2246 3 - Moderate II (Orange)
6 T-14 136 0.2107 5 - Extreme II (Orange)
7 T-15 136 0.2107 5 - Extreme II (Orange)
8 T-13 687 0.1833 5 - Extreme II (Orange)
9 B-3 1075 0.1820 3 - Moderate II (Orange)
10 B-4 879 0.1820 3 - Moderate II (Orange)
Table 15: Top 10 components ranked by vulnerability level for S-1 (minor malevolent acts).
Average Load Failure Frequency
Shed (MW) (outages / year)
1 T-13 687 0.1833 0.44 0.0806
2 T-5 374 0.1055 0.48 0.0506
3 T-30 136 0.0883 0.54 0.0477
4 T-21 136 0.0883 0.52 0.0459
5 T-2 190 0.0883 0.51 0.0451
6 T-23 415 0.1055 0.38 0.0401
7 T-34 136 0.0883 0.45 0.0398
8 T-12 136 0.0883 0.44 0.0389
9 T-8 239 0.1055 0.36 0.0380
10 T-25-1(2) 136 0.0883 0.41 0.0362
Table 16: Top 10 components ranked according to their expected disutility for S-1 (random failures).
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Looking at the results for the random failure events, high failure frequency was
the dominant consideration for the rankings. Transmission line T-13, ranked #1 on the
list, is one of two lines that connect a remote load bus, bus 6, to the grid. Upon failure of
T-13, only moderate load shed results due to the other line connected to bus 6 having the
ability to be loaded more minimizing the impact. However, due to its relatively high
failure frequency, T-13 represents the most expected disutility to stakeholder S-1 by
resulting in moderate impact to Lost Revenue and Customer Image. The components that
resulted in higher load shed usually were associated with very low failure frequencies
which reduced their expected impacts to S-1.
It was expected that the value of each generator would be high given the
limitation placed on the modeling of generation at each bus. It was also expected that the
buses would result in large consequences due to the load directly connected to the bus
being completely lost when it fails. The infrastructure analysis did result in a large
amount of load being shed when a bus or generator was selected as the initial failed
component, which would have caused them to stand out in a conventional stability
analysis of the grid. However, transmission lines are the highest ranked contributors with
respect to both random events (expected disutility) and malevolent acts (vulnerability) for
stakeholder S-1. This is due to the amount of load shed being only one of the factors that
determine risk significance. In general, the high susceptibility level (extreme) and higher
failure frequencies of the transmission lines are the key factors that elevated them in the
rankings above the other types of components even though the amount of load is usually
smaller.
4.2 Sensitivity Evaluation
To determine the sensitivity of the results to the input provided by the various
participating members, the component rankings were produced using each stakeholder's
input. The rankings from each stakeholder are then compared to evaluate their
differences.
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As shown in Table 17, the five stakeholders' views of importance of the ICs
include many differences. This provided very strong differences in the weights of each
performance measure. The top ten components ranked by their vulnerability level and
expected disutility for each stakeholder are presented in Table 18 and 19, respectively.
IC / PM S-1 S-2 S-3 S-4 S-5
Economics 0.2441 (2) 0.2849 (2) 0.0614 (4) 0.1088 (3) 0.1991 (2)
Lost Revenue 0.2092 (2) 0.2493 (2) 0.0491 (5) 0.0907 (4) 0.1493 (3)
Repair / 0.0349 (7) 0.0356 (6) 0.0123 (8) 0.0181 (6) 0.0498 (5)Replace
Image 0.5058 (1) 0.4935 (1) 0.1487 (3) 0.0405 (4) 0.0427 (4)
Public 0.0388 (6) 0.0347 (7) 0.0266 (6) 0.0077 (7) 0.0101 (7)
Political 0.3693 (1) 0.1270 (4) 0.1054 (4) 0.0300 (5) 0.0297 (6)
Customer 0.0977 (4) 0.3318 (1) 0.0167 (7) 0.0028 (8) 0.0029 (8)
Health & 0.1667 (3) 0.1645 (3) 0.4954 (1) 0.5139 (1) 0.6504 (1)Safety
General Public 0.0333 (8) 0.0274 (8) 0.2477 (2) 0.4111(1) 0.3252 (1)
Utility Worker 0.1333 (3) 0.1371 (3) 0.2477 (2) 0.1028 (3) 0.3252 (1)
Environment 0.0834 (4) 0.0570 (4) 0.2946 (2) 0.3368 (2) 0.1078 (3)
Fauna 0.0834 (5) 0.0571 (5) 0.2946 (1) 0.3368 (2) 0.1078 (4)
Table 17: Value tree weights (rankings) for each IC and PM by stakeholder.
The results of the comparisons between the component rankings of the stakeholders
are surprising. Each stakeholder's vulnerability ranking results in very similar results
with few differences in the components identified, the order of the components, and the
vulnerability levels associated with each component within the rankings. Inspection of
the effects each IC has on the overall value for each stakeholder resulted in the following
findings:
* The Economics and Image ICs are more sensitive than the other ICs to the range
of physical consequences that can result from component failures in the grid.
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* The Health & Safety and Environment ICs have very little influence on the overall
failure scenario impact unless the physical consequences include a lengthy
duration and/or a very large number of customers are affected by the scenario.
Even though S-3, S-4, and S-5 rank Health & Safety and Environment highly, the higher
level of these ICs are not effected until the physical consequences reach a very large
scale. In order to impact these higher levels, almost half of the power grid would need to
be shed which did not occurred in this study. This was in line with the consensus reached
at the input elicitation workshop that the impact to Health & Safety and Environment was
small unless a catastrophic event takes place. Without the higher scales of these IC being
affected, the Economics and Image ICs are the key factors that determine a component's
value. This results in similar random event and malevolent act rankings of the
components among all stakeholders.
Rank S-I S-2 S-3 S-4 S-5
T-16 /I T-16 / I T-16 / II T-16 / II T-16 / II1 (Red) (Red) (Orange) (Orange) (Orange)
T-17 / I T-17 / I T-17 / II T-17 / II T-17 / II2 (Red) (Red) (Orange) (Orange) (Orange)
T-7 / I T-7 /I T-7 / II B-17 / II B-17 / II3 (Red) (Red) (Orange) (Orange) (Orange)
B-17 / II T-14 / I B-17 / II B-20 / II B-20 / II4 (Orange) (Red) (Orange) (Orange) (Orange)
B-20 / II T-15 /I B-20 / II T-7 / II T-7 / II
(Orange) (Red) (Orange) (Orange) (Orange)
T-14 / II T-13 / I T-13 / II T-13 / II T-14 / II
(Orange) (Red) (Orange) (Orange) (Orange)
T-15 / II T-8 / II T-14 / II T-14 / II T-15 / II
(Orange) (Orange) (Orange) (Orange) (Orange)
T-13 / II B-17 / II T-15 / II T-15 / II T-13 / II
(Orange) (Orange) (Orange) (Orange) (Orange)
B-3 / II B-20 / II G-13 / III G-13 / III T-23 / II
(Orange) (Orange) (Yellow) (Yellow) (Orange)
B-4 / II B-3 / II G-18 / III B-3 / III T-5 / II
10 (Orange) (Orange) (Yellow) (Yellow) (Orange)
Table 18: Top 10 components ranked by vulnerability level for all stakeholders.
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Rank S-1 S-2 S-3 S-4 S-5
T-13 T-13 T-13 T-13 T-13
[0.0806] [0.1172] [0.0417] [0.0320] [0.0366]
T-5 T-5 T-30 T-30 T-302 [0.0506] [0.1108] [0.0203] [0.0145] [0.0300]
T-30 T-30 T-21 T-21 T-213 [0.0477] [0.0932] [0.0195] [0.0140] [0.0289]
T-21 T-21 T-5 T-2 T-24 [0.0459] [0.0898] [0.0194] [0.0137] [0.0283]
T-2 T-2 T-2 T-5 T-55 [0.0451] [0.0880] [0.0191] [0.0131] [0.0269]
T-23 T-23 T-34 T-34 T-346 [0.0401] [0.0877] [0.0169] [0.0121] [0.0250]
T-34 T-8 T-12 T-12 T-127 [0.0398] [0.0831] [0.0165] [0.0118] [0.0244]
T-12 T-34 T-25-1 T-25-1 T-25-18 [0.0389] [0.0777] [0.0154] [0.0110] [0.0228]
T-8 T-12 T-25-2 T-25-2 T-25-29 [0.0380] [0.0759] [0.0154] [0.0110] [0.0228]
10 T-25-1(2) T-25-1(2) T-26 T-26 T-26
[0.0362] [0.0709] [0.0154] [0.0110] [0.0228]
Table 19: Top 10 components ranked by expected disutility for all stakeholders.
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5. Concluding Remarks
The methodology presented in this paper provides a systematic process that
produces a ranking of the elements within the bulk power grid for random failures and
malevolent acts. This ranking is not dictated by the amount of load shed when a specific
component experiences failure but, rather, multiple aspects that make up the risk a
component adds to the system, as determined by the impacts to the stakeholders, is used
to determine the ranking. The reasons for each component's position in the rankings are
identifiable and can be traced back to the stakeholder preferences and the infrastructure
itself. These results should be viewed as a first input to a deliberation by the stakeholders
in which their reasonableness of the rankings is debated and the assumptions of the
analysis scrutinized [32]. The results of this analysis process are also stakeholder
dependent. Any other stakeholder, such as a federal agency like the Department of
Homeland Security, could include additional PMs and discard some that we have
included in our study. However, the methodology is unchanged and would result in a
component ranking appropriate for the new stakeholder's views.
There are several areas in which additional work is required to improve the
analysis. The identification and modeling of more specific customer groups would
improve the value assessment of each component in the grid by allowing a more specific
look at the effects on customers during power outages. Customer prioritization for load
shedding would also increase the accuracy of the analysis by not including the customers
that pay a premium for more reliable service in most load shedding scenarios.
Application of this methodology to an actual portion of the North American
power grid would also provide the realism needed to generate more support for the
methodology. The power flow simulation model is in its infancy and is being improved
regarding its generator modeling capabilities and load shedding scheme. This will allow
the results for forced outages of generators to be more realistic. Further improvements to
the model will also include mitigation measures to minimize load shedding to better
reflect the application of such in the industry. It is also realized that placing each
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component into a susceptibility level but its type is also not completely realistic, such as
all buses in the Moderate susceptibility level. This assumption eliminates probably the
most significant risk to a substation, the intentional vandalism of transformers. To
increase the accuracy of the analysis, the analyst must identify each component's
susceptibility on a case by cases bases. This was not possible with the application of the
RTS-96 single area grid due to the limited data provided for each component.
This paper's purpose is to present the MIT risk ranking methodology as it applies
to the bulk power grid. The load flow simulation model used in the presentation of this
methodology is not the focal point. The analysts are not bound to perform the
infrastructure analysis in this manner and may choose any method of analysis suitable to
meet their needs. The assumptions made in this paper are sometimes broad and may
appear to oversimplify the analysis. However, the improvements suggested above to
increase the realism of the individual tools used would not affect the overall
methodology.
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Appendices
A. Analytic Hierarchy Process Results
A.1 Stakeholder S-1 Results
Impact Categories
1 2 3 4
1 Economics 1 1/4 2 4
2 Image 4 1 2 4
3 Health & Safety 1/2 1/2 1 2
4 Environment 1/4 1/4 1/2 1
weights 0.2441 0.5058 0.1667 0.0834
PM Image
1 2 3
1 Public 1 1/6 1/4
2 Political 6 1 6
3 Customers 4 1/6 1
local weights 0.0767 0.7302 0.1932
global weights 0.0388 0.3693 0.0977
PM Economics
1 2
1 Lost Revenue 1 6
2 Repairs / Replace 1/6 1
local weights 0.8571 0.1429
global weights 0.2092 0.0349
PM Health & Safety
1 2
1 General Public 1 1/4
2 Utility Worker 4 1
local weights 0.2000 0.8000
global weights 0.0333 0.1334
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A.2 Stakeholder S-2 Results
Impact Categories
1 2 3 4
1 Economics 1 1/3 3 5
2 Image 3 1 3 5
3 Health & Safety 1/3 1/3 1 5
4 Environment 1/5 1/5 1/5 1
weights 0.2849 0.4935 0.1645 0.0570
PM Image
1 2 3
1 Public 1 1/7 1/5
2 Political 7 1 1/5
3 Customers 5 5 1
local weights 0.0703 0.2573 0.6724
global weights 0.0347 0.1270 0.3318
PM Economics
1 2
1 Lost Revenue 1 7
2 Repairs / Replace 1/7 1
local weights 0.8750 0.1250
global weights 0.2493 0.0356
PM Health & Safety1 2
1 General Public 1 5
2 Utility Worker 1/5 1
local weights 0.1667 0.8333
global weights 0.0274 0.1371
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A.3 Stakeholder S-3 Results
Impact Categories
1 2 3 4
1 Economics 1 1/4 1/4 1/7
2 Image 4 1 1/5 1/2
3 Health & Safety 5 5 1 2
4 Environment 7 2 1/2 1
weights 0.0614 0.1487 0.4954 0.2946
PM Image
1 2 3
1 Public 1 1/5 2
2 Political 5 1 5
3 Customers 1/2 1/5 1
local weights 0.1786 0.7089 0.1125
global weights 0.0266 0.1054 0.0167
PM Economics
1 2
1 Lost Revenue 1 4
2 Repairs / Replace 1/4 1
local weights 0.8000 0.2000
global weights 0.0491 0.0123
PM Health & Safety
1 2
1 General Public 1 1
2 Utility Worker 1 1
local weights 0.5000 0.5000
global weights 0.2477 0.2477
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A.4 Stakeholder S-4 Results
Impact Categories
1 2 3 4
1 Economics 1 6 1/7 1/6
2 Image 1/6 1 1/8 1/6
3 Health & Safety 7 8 1 2
4 Environment 6 6 1/2 1
weights 0.1088 0.0405 0.5139 0.3368
PM Image
1 2 3
1 Public 1 1/7 5
2 Political 7 1 6
3 Customers 1/5 1/6 1
local weights 0.1905 0.7409 0.0686
global weights 0.0077 0.033 0.0028
PM Economics
1 2
1 Lost Revenue 1 5
2 Repairs / Replace 1/5 1
local weights 0.8333 0.1667
global weights 0.0907 0.0181
PM Health & Safety
1 2
1 General Public 1 4
2 Utility Worker 1/4 1
local weights 0.8000 0.2000
global weights 0.4111 0.1028
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A.5 Stakeholder S-5 Results
Impact Categories
1 2 3 4
1 Economics 1 6 1/6 3
2 Image 1/6 1 1/7 1/5
3 Health & Safety 6 7 1 7
4 Environment 1/3 5 1/7 1
weights 0.1991 0.0427 0.6504 0.1078
PM Image
1 2 3
1 Public 1 1/5 6
2 Political 5 1 6
3 Customers 1/6 1/6 1
local weights 0.2376 0.6947 0.0677
global weights 0.0101 0.0297 0.0029
PM Economics
1 2
1 Lost Revenue 1 3
2 Repairs / Replace 1/3 1
local weights 0.7500 0.2500
global weights 0.1493 0.0498
PM Health & Safety1 2
1 General Public 1 1
2 Utility Worker 1 1
local weights 0.5000 0.5000
global weights 0.3252 0.3252
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B. Load Shed Vectors (% of load lost at each load bus)
B.1 Transmission Lines
Only buses that experience load shed when analyzing transmission lines are shown.
Line
T-1
T-2
T-3
T-4
T-5
T-6
T-7
T-8
T-9
T-10
T-11
T-12
T-13
T-14
T-15
T-16
T-17
T-18
T-19
T-20
T-21
T-22
T-23
T-24
T-25-1
T-25-2
T-26
T-27
T-28
T-29
T-30
T-31-1
T-31-2
T-32-1
T-32-2
T-33-1
T-33-2
T-34
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Bus #
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 14
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.10 0.10 0.00 0.10 0.10 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.00 0.10 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 1.00 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.10 0.00 0.40 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.30 0.20 0.00 0.70 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.10 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.90 0.90 0.70 0.90 0.90 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.40 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.60 0.60 0.30 0.60 0.60 1.00 0.30 0.30 0.30 1.00 0.00
0.80 0.80 0.60 0.80 0.80 1.00 0.20 0.20 0.20 1.00 0.20
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.90 0.80 0.90 0.80 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.10 0.00 0.40 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.000.00__ 0.00_ 0.0 1_ _ 0.00 0__00 1.0 1_ _ 0.0 0 .0 0.00_ 1 0.00_ 1 0.00
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B.2 Generators
Only buses that experience load shed when analyzing generators are shown.
Bus #
Gen. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 13
1 0.30 0.40 0.00 0.30 0.30 1.00 0.30 0.50 0.00 0.10 0.00
2 0.20 0.20 0.00 0.10 0.20 1.00 0.20 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00
7 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.30 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00
13 0.90 0.90 0.70 0.90 0.90 1.00 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.40
15 0.60 0.60 0.00 0.50 0.60 1.00 0.30 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00
16 0.60 0.60 0.00 0.50 0.60 1.00 0.30 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00
18 0.60 0.60 0.00 0.40 0.50 1.00 0.30 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00
21 0.60 0.60 0.10 0.50 0.60 1.00 0.30 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00
22 0.60 0.60 0.00 0.50 0.60 1.00 0.30 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00
23 0.60 0.60 0.10 0.60 0.60 1.00 0.40 0.50 0.00 0.10 0.00
B.3 Buses
Only buses that experience load shed when analyzing buses are shown. Self indicates
that the load connected to the bus that fails is completely lost.
Bus #
Bus 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 13 14 Self
1 1.00 0.60 0.00 0.60 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
2 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.10 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
3 0.80 0.80 1.00 0.80 0.80 1.00 0.80 0.80 0.50 0.80 0.00 0.00 1.00
4 0.70 0.70 0.50 1.00 0.70 1.00 0.50 0.70 0.40 0.70 0.00 0.00 1.00
5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
7 0.60 0.60 0.00 0.60 0.60 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
8 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
9 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
11 0.60 0.60 0.30 0.60 0.60 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.20 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
12 0.60 0.60 0.20 0.60 0.60 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00
13 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 1.00 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 1.00 0.00 1.00
14 0.80 0.80 0.60 0.80 0.80 1.00 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.30 0.00 1.00
15 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.60 0.70 1.00 0.20 0.40 0.10 0.10 0.00 0.00 1.00
16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
17 0.90 0.90 0.70 0.90 0.90 1.00 0.90 0.90 0.80 0.90 0.00 0.50 0.00
18 0.60 0.60 0.10 0.60 0.60 1.00 0.30 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
20 1.00 1.00 0.80 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.90 0.90 0.00 0.00 1.00
21 0.60 0.60 0.00 0.40 0.50 1.00 0.30 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
22 0.60 0.60 0.00 0.50 0.60 1.00 0.30 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
23 0.70 0.70 0.10 0.70 0.70 1.00 0.60 0.70 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00
24 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 1.00 0.30 0.50 0.10 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00
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C. Physical Consequence Results
C.1 Transmission Lines
Line Duration # Residential # Commercial # S-M # Large(hrs) Industrial Industrial
T-1 16 48,470 6,850 395 0
T-2 10 81,891 8,464 898 0
T-3 10 48,470 6,850 395 0
T-4 10 67,855 9,257 619 0
T-5 10 162,699 16,635 1,619 1
T-6 10 60,932 5,580 690 0
T-7 768 98,080 8,920 1,105 0
T-8 10 89,441 12,778 1,103 0
T-9 10 60,932 5,580 690 0
T-10 35 7,448 1,189 63 0
T-11 10 0 0 0 0
T-12 10 60,932 5,580 690 0
T-13 10 275,715 34,394 2,938 0
T-14 768 60,932 5,580 690 0
T-15 768 60,932 5,580 690 0
T-16 768 316,417 33,322 3,042 3
T-17 768 355,696 39,847 3,592 5
T-18 11 60,932 5,580 690 0
T-19 11 60,932 5,580 690 0
T-20 11 60,932 5,580 690 0
T-21 11 60,932 5,580 690 0
T-22 11 0 0 0 0
T-23 11 155,862 22,462 1,767 0
T-24 11 60,932 5,580 690 0
T-25-1 11 60,932 5,580 690 0
T-25-2 11 60,932 5,580 690 0
T-26 11 98,080 8,920 1,105 0
T-27 11 60,932 5,580 690 0
T-28 11 0 0 0 0
T-29 11 60,932 5,580 690 0
T-30 11 60,932 5,580 690 0
T-31-1 11 60,932 5,580 690 0
T-31-2 11 60,932 5,580 690 0
T-32-1 11 60,932 5,580 690 0
T-32-2 11 60,932 5,580 690 0
T-33-1 11 60,932 5,580 690 0
T-33-2 11 60,932 5,580 690 0
T-34 11 60,932 5,580 690 0
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C.2 Generators
Gen. Duration # Residential # Commercial # S-M # Large(hrs) Industrial Industrial
1 40 161,110 18,946 1,623 2
2 40 106,837 12,204 1,118 1
7 50 30,203 3,391 248 1
13 50 554,649 57,526 5,056 9
15 40 171,228 23,261 1,797 2
16 40 179,060 23,929 1,862 2
18 150 167,706 22,191 1,734 2
21 150 187,380 24,609 1,956 2
22 20 179,060 23,929 1,862 2
23 40 203,608 26,519 2,114 2
C.3 Buses
Bus Duration # Residential # Commercial # S-M # Large(hrs) Industrial Industrial
1 10 129,447 18,794 1,437 1
2 10 109,416 12,623 1,059 0
3 10 457,863 49,333 4,428 7
4 10 368,182 41,515 3,611 4
5 10 82,232 10,280 970 0
6 10 60,932 5,580 690 0
7 10 214,381 29,324 2,175 2
8 10 78,312 6,680 650 5
9 10 150,192 11,680 1,245 2
10 10 99,890 6,259 825 2
11 10 269,457 28,653 2,674 2
12 10 181,225 22,965 1,920 0
13 10 395,478 36,580 3,493 11
14 10 490,664 51,109 4,500 8
15 10 340,587 48,430 4,193 36
16 10 32,000 4,000 750 12
17 10 528,274 58,186 5,048 11
18 10 275,792 43,709 3,672 40
19 10 65,440 9,600 750 5
20 10 573,505 65,813 5,587 13
21 10 167,706 22,191 1,734 2
22 10 179,060 23,929 1,862 2
23 10 279,891 33,988 2,779 4
24 10 268,578 32,783 2,822 2
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D. Consequence Matrices
These matrices are used to map the physical consequences of a failure scenario to the
constructed scales.
Description
Outage Duration
[undreds of Millions of Dollars
'ens ofMillions ofDollars
illions ofDollars
sens ofThousands ofDollars
housands of Dollars
Fo Impact
Residential
10 hours I day I week
N/A - N/A 500,000
..............NIA:.....000 NA. 500O. .1.000.00 400.000 50,000
100,000 40.000i 5,000
10.000 4,000 50.... .. ............ ..  .......................
1,000; 400: 50
Comnm'
10hours Iday i
N/A N/Ai
........ ..  .. . ..
...................N /IA ! ....6.. 00........0
15,0010 6.5001
1.500. ! 650!
I week
N/A
1000
100
Small-Medium Industrial
10 hours i day I week
N/A N/A N/A
10,001; 4,000 i 600
1,000! 400; 60
N/AI N/Ai N/A
N/A NIA NIA
N/AI NIAI 100
........ ....... ........ .. 204 S. I
Iundreds of Millions of Dollars
'ens ofMilions of Dollars
.illions ofDollars
...ndreds ofhousands of.... Dollars.......................
'ens of Thousands of Dollars
7housands of Dollars
io Impact
rntemrnational media interest
epeated publicatins national media
repeated publications in local media, appearance in
ataional media
Sappe an in lo al me.....................dia
gfo Impact
olaital p-sh for major regulation reform
doderate poistilcalP.ush for additional reg ns
w politicalinfluence on industy regulations
NTo Impact
Milions ofDollars
Hundreds of Millions of Dollars
Tens of Millions ofDollars
Millions ofDollars
Hundreds of Thousands of Dollars
No Irmpact
Numerous deaths contributed to power ut
........................ .  .. .. .............. " -
Few deaths contributed to power outageNuerous long-term inuries related to power
Few long-term injuries / numerous short-term injuries
related to power outage
Few Short-ter injie relatedto powe . .ero.ute...
No Impact
ILgh safety impact on worker associated with repairs
Moderate safety impact on worker associated with
epars.......
Low safety impact on worker associated with repairs
No Impact
Extensive impact on wildlife, decades required for
Medium impact on wildlife, several years required for
ecoery.....
Minor impact on wildlife, few years required for
INo Impact
10,000i 10.000i 500
500 500 100
0i 0 0
N•IA. NIA N/A
N/A NIA 1.000,000
N/A0 1,000,000 750,00
1.000.000. 750,0091 500.000
5,000
500!
.. . ... ..0
5W00
0
300
0
N/A. N/A 100,000
75000... 50000 30'000
30,000 25,000: 3000
0 0 0
100000 50,000 30,000
10000 5,000 3,000
1,000 500 300
100 50 30
10 5 3
0' 0 0
N/A N/A N/A
N/A N/A NIA
N/A NIAW N/A.. . .. 
1.000
500i
0
1.0001
0 '8
500
200
N/A4 N/N 10,000............... • /A,: ... 7;000 -"5;, .0
..............1 .... •3 oo
0 0: 0
N/A N/A: 4,000
3,000 2,000 400
300 200 40
30 20 4
3 1
N/A N/AN......A......... NIA:NIA NIA.
N/ N/An[: :::
N/AN/A
NIA
. .... .... .. .
50o 50o
15i 10(
0 0'
..... ..... . .... ...............................75i 50! 40
35: 25 10
0 0. 0
N/AI N/A N/A
N/A N/A N/A
N/A 100 20
........ .. 5.... ........ 1
20 1 N/A
0 0 0
N/Ai
N/Ai
N/A......
N/A N/A
N/A: N/A
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Appendix E
E. Component Impact on Each PM by Stakeholder
E.1 Stakeholder S-1
Economics Image Health & Safety Environment
Lost General UtilityComponent Revenue Repair Public Political Customers Publc Worker FaunaRevenue Public Worker
T-1 0.0368 0.0024 0.0073 0.0000 0.0324 0.0000 0.0094 0.0000
T-2 0.0368 0.0024 0.0073 0.0000 0.0324 0.0000 0.0094 0.0000
T-3 0.0368 0.0024 0.0073 0.0000 0.0324 0.0000 0.0094 0.0000
T-4 0.0368 0.0024 0.0073 0.0000 0.0324 0.0000 0.0094 0.0000
T-5 0.0368 0.0024 0.0073 0.0000 0.0495 0.0000 0.0094 0.0000
T-6 0.0368 0.0024 0.0073 0.0000 0.0324 0.0000 0.0094 0.0000
T-7 0.1132 0.0024 0.0189 0.0592 0.0495 0.0000 0.0094 0.0057
T-8 0.0368 0.0024 0.0073 0.0000 0.0495 0.0000 0.0094 0.0000
T-9 0.0368 0.0024 0.0073 0.0000 0.0324 0.0000 0.0094 0.0000
T-10 0.0144 0.0024 0.0073 0.0000 0.0324 0.0000 0.0094 0.0000
T-11 0.0000 0.0024 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0094 0.0000
T-12 0.0368 0.0024 0.0073 0.0000 0.0324 0.0000 0.0094 0.0000
T-13 0.0368 0.0024 0.0189 0.0592 0.0495 0.0012 0.0094 0.0057
T-14 0.0771 0.0024 0.0073 0.0592 0.0495 0.0000 0.0094 0.0057
T-15 0.0771 0.0024 0.0073 0.0592 0.0495 0.0000 0.0094 0.0057
T-16 0.1132 0.0024 0.0189 0.1332 0.0977 0.0036 0.0094 0.0237
T-17 0.1132 0.0024 0.0189 0.1332 0.0977 0.0036 0.0094 0.0237
T-18 0.0368 0.0024 0.0073 0.0000 0.0324 0.0000 0.0094 0.0000
T-19 0.0368 0.0024 0.0073 0.0000 0.0324 0.0000 0.0094 0.0000
T-20 0.0368 0.0024 0.0073 0.0000 0.0324 0.0000 0.0094 0.0000
T-21 0.0368 0.0024 0.0073 0.0000 0.0324 0.0000 0.0094 0.0000
T-22 0.0000 0.0024 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0094 0.0000
T-23 0.0368 0.0024 0.0073 0.0000 0.0495 0.0000 0.0094 0.0000
T-24 0.0368 0.0024 0.0073 0.0000 0.0324 0.0000 0.0094 0.0000
T-25-1 0.0368 0.0024 0.0073 0.0000 0.0324 0.0000 0.0094 0.0000
T-25-2 0.0368 0.0024 0.0073 0.0000 0.0324 0.0000 0.0094 0.0000
T-26 0.0368 0.0024 0.0073 0.0000 0.0324 0.0000 0.0094 0.0000
T-27 0.0368 0.0024 0.0073 0.0000 0.0324 0.0000 0.0094 0.0000
T-28 0.0000 0.0024 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0094 0.0000
T-29 0.0368 0.0024 0.0073 0.0000 0.0324 0.0000 0.0094 0.0000
T-30 0.0368 0.0024 0.0073 0.0000 0.0324 0.0000 0.0094 0.0000
T-31-1 0.0368 0.0024 0.0073 0.0000 0.0324 0.0000 0.0094 0.0000
T-31-2 0.0368 0.0024 0.0073 0.0000 0.0324 0.0000 0.0094 0.0000
T-32-1 0.0368 0.0024 0.0073 0.0000 0.0324 0.0000 0.0094 0.0000
T-32-2 0.0368 0.0024 0.0073 0.0000 0.0324 0.0000 0.0094 0.0000
T-33-1 0.0368 0.0024 0.0073 0.0000 0.0324 0.0000 0.0094 0.0000
T-33-2 0.0368 0.0024 0.0073 0.0000 0.0324 0.0000 0.0094 0.0000
T-34 0.0368 0.0024 0.0073 0.0000 0.0324 0.0000 0.0094 0.0000
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Economics Image Health & Safety Environment
Component Revenue Repair Public Political Customers General Worker Fauna
G-1 0.0771 0.0024 0.0073 0.0000 0.0495 0.0000 0.0094 0.0000
G-2 0.0368 0.0024 0.0073 0.0000 0.0495 0.0000 0.0094 0.0000
G-7 0.0368 0.0024 0.0073 0.0000 0.0324 0.0000 0.0094 0.0000
G-13 0.0771 0.0024 0.0189 0.1332 0.0977 0.0036 0.0094 0.0237
G-15 0.0771 0.0024 0.0073 0.0000 0.0495 0.0000 0.0094 0.0000
G-16 0.0771 0.0024 0.0073 0.0000 0.0495 0.0000 0.0094 0.0000
G-18 0.0771 0.0024 0.0189 0.0592 0.0495 0.0012 0.0094 0.0057
G-21 0.0771 0.0024 0.0189 0.0592 0.0495 0.0012 0.0094 0.0057
G-22 0.0368 0.0024 0.0073 0.0000 0.0495 0.0000 0.0094 0.0000
G-23 0.0771 0.0024 0.0189 0.0592 0.0495 0.0000 0.0094 0.0057
B-1 0.0368 0.0012 0.0073 0.0000 0.0495 0.0000 0.0094 0.0000
B-2 0.0368 0.0012 0.0073 0.0000 0.0495 0.0000 0.0094 0.0000
B-3 0.0368 0.0012 0.0189 0.0592 0.0495 0.0012 0.0094 0.0057
B-4 0.0368 0.0012 0.0189 0.0592 0.0495 0.0012 0.0094 0.0057
B-5 0.0368 0.0012 0.0073 0.0000 0.0495 0.0000 0.0094 0.0000
B-6 0.0368 0.0012 0.0073 0.0000 0.0324 0.0000 0.0094 0.0000
B-7 0.0368 0.0012 0.0073 0.0000 0.0495 0.0000 0.0094 0.0000
B-8 0.0368 0.0012 0.0073 0.0000 0.0324 0.0000 0.0094 0.0000
B-9 0.0368 0.0012 0.0073 0.0000 0.0495 0.0000 0.0094 0.0000
B-10 0.0368 0.0012 0.0073 0.0000 0.0324 0.0000 0.0094 0.0000
B-11 0.0368 0.0012 0.0073 0.0000 0.0495 0.0012 0.0094 0.0000
B-12 0.0368 0.0012 0.0073 0.0000 0.0495 0.0000 0.0094 0.0000
B-13 0.0368 0.0012 0.0189 0.0592 0.0495 0.0012 0.0094 0.0057
B-14 0.0368 0.0012 0.0189 0.0592 0.0495 0.0012 0.0094 0.0057
B-15 0.0368 0.0012 0.0189 0.0592 0.0495 0.0012 0.0094 0.0057
B-16 0.0144 0.0012 0.0073 0.0000 0.0324 0.0000 0.0094 0.0000
B-17 0.0771 0.0012 0.0189 0.0592 0.0495 0.0036 0.0094 0.0057
B-18 0.0368 0.0012 0.0189 0.0592 0.0495 0.0012 0.0094 0.0000
B-19 0.0368 0.0012 0.0073 0.0000 0.0324 0.0000 0.0094 0.0057
B-20 0.0771 0.0012 0.0189 0.0592 0.0495 0.0036 0.0094 0.0057
B-21 0.0368 0.0012 0.0073 0.0000 0.0495 0.0000 0.0094 0.0000
B-22 0.0368 0.0012 0.0073 0.0000 0.0495 0.0000 0.0094 0.0000
B-23 0.0368 0.0012 0.0189 0.0592 0.0495 0.0012 0.0094 0.0000
B-24 0.0368 0.0012 0.0189 0.0592 0.0495 0.0012 0.0094 0.0000
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E.2 Stakeholder S-2
Anhn onc S etebr20
Economics Image Health & Safety Environment
Lost General UtilityComponent Lost Repair Public Political Customers Geul FaunaRevenue Public Worker
T-1 0.0439 0.0024 0.0065 0.0000 0.1101 0.0000 0.0097 0.0000
T-2 0.0439 0.0024 0.0065 0.0000 0.1101 0.0000 0.0097 0.0000
T-3 0.0439 0.0024 0.0065 0.0000 0.1101 0.0000 0.0097 0.0000
T-4 0.0439 0.0024 0.0065 0.0000 0.1101 0.0000 0.0097 0.0000
T-5 0.0439 0.0024 0.0065 0.0000 0.1682 0.0000 0.0097 0.0000
T-6 0.0439 0.0024 0.0065 0.0000 0.1101 0.0000 0.0097 0.0000
T-7 0.1348 0.0024 0.0169 0.0204 0.1682 0.0000 0.0097 0.0039
T-8 0.0439 0.0024 0.0065 0.0000 0.1682 0.0000 0.0097 0.0000
T-9 0.0439 0.0024 0.0065 0.0000 0.1101 0.0000 0.0097 0.0000
T-10 0.0171 0.0024 0.0065 0.0000 0.1101 0.0000 0.0097 0.0000
T-11 0.0000 0.0024 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0097 0.0000
T-12 0.0439 0.0024 0.0065 0.0000 0.1101 0.0000 0.0097 0.0000
T-13 0.0439 0.0024 0.0169 0.0204 0.1682 0.0010 0.0097 0.0039
T-14 0.0918 0.0024 0.0065 0.0204 0.1682 0.0000 0.0097 0.0039
T-15 0.0918 0.0024 0.0065 0.0204 0.1682 0.0000 0.0097 0.0039
T-16 0.1348 0.0024 0.0169 0.0458 0.3318 0.0030 0.0097 0.0162
T-17 0.1348 0.0024 0.0169 0.0458 0.3318 0.0030 0.0097 0.0162
T-18 0.0439 0.0024 0.0065 0.0000 0.1101 0.0000 0.0097 0.0000
T-19 0.0439 0.0024 0.0065 0.0000 0.1101 0.0000 0.0097 0.0000
T-20 0.0439 0.0024 0.0065 0.0000 0.1101 0.0000 0.0097 0.0000
T-21 0.0439 0.0024 0.0065 0.0000 0.1101 0.0000 0.0097 0.0000
T-22 0.0000 0.0024 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0097 0.0000
T-23 0.0439 0.0024 0.0065 0.0000 0.1682 0.0000 0.0097 0.0000
T-24 0.0439 0.0024 0.0065 0.0000 0.1101 0.0000 0.0097 0.0000
T-25-1 0.0439 0.0024 0.0065 0.0000 0.1101 0.0000 0.0097 0.0000
T-25-2 0.0439 0.0024 0.0065 0.0000 0.1101 0.0000 0.0097 0.0000
T-26 0.0439 0.0024 0.0065 0.0000 0.1101 0.0000 0.0097 0.0000
T-27 0.0439 0.0024 0.0065 0.0000 0.1101 0.0000 0.0097 0.0000
T-28 0.0000 0.0024 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0097 0.0000
T-29 0.0439 0.0024 0.0065 0.0000 0.1101 0.0000 0.0097 0.0000
T-30 0.0439 0.0024 0.0065 0.0000 0.1101 0.0000 0.0097 0.0000
T-31-1 0.0439 0.0024 0.0065 0.0000 0.1101 0.0000 0.0097 0.0000
T-31-2 0.0439 0.0024 0.0065 0.0000 0.1101 0.0000 0.0097 0.0000
T-32-1 0.0439 0.0024 0.0065 0.0000 0.1101 0.0000 0.0097 0.0000
T-32-2 0.0439 0.0024 0.0065 0.0000 0.1101 0.0000 0.0097 0.0000
T-33-1 0.0439 0.0024 0.0065 0.0000 0.1101 0.0000 0.0097 0.0000
T-33-2 0.0439 0.0024 0.0065 0.0000 0.1101 0.0000 0.0097 0.0000
T-34 0.0439 0.0024 0.0065 0.0000 0.1101 0.0000 0.0097 0.0000
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Economics Image Health & Safety Environment
Lost General Utility
Component ReLostue Repair Public Political Customers Gb Wokr FaunaRevenue Public Worker
G-1 0.0918 0.0024 0.0065 0.0000 0.1682 0.0000 0.0097 0.0000
G-2 0.0439 0.0024 0.0065 0.0000 0.1682 0.0000 0.0097 0.0000
G-7 0.0439 0.0024 0.0065 0.0000 0.1101 0.0000 0.0097 0.0000
G-13 0.0918 0.0024 0.0169 0.0458 0.3318 0.0030 0.0097 0.0162
G-15 0.0918 0.0024 0.0065 0.0000 0.1682 0.0000 0.0097 0.0000
G-16 0.0918 0.0024 0.0065 0.0000 0.1682 0.0000 0.0097 0.0000
G-18 0.0918 0.0024 0.0169 0.0204 0.1682 0.0010 0.0097 0.0039
G-21 0.0918 0.0024 0.0169 0.0204 0.1682 0.0010 0.0097 0.0039
G-22 0.0439 0.0024 0.0065 0.0000 0.1682 0.0000 0.0097 0.0000
G-23 0.0918 0.0024 0.0169 0.0204 0.1682 0.0000 0.0097 0.0039
B-1 0.0439 0.0012 0.0065 0.0000 0.1682 0.0000 0.0097 0.0000
B-2 0.0439 0.0012 0.0065 0.0000 0.1682 0.0000 0.0097 0.0000
B-3 0.0439 0.0012 0.0169 0.0204 0.1682 0.0010 0.0097 0.0039
B-4 0.0439 0.0012 0.0169 0.0204 0.1682 0.0010 0.0097 0.0039
B-5 0.0439 0.0012 0.0065 0.0000 0.1682 0.0000 0.0097 0.0000
B-6 0.0439 0.0012 0.0065 0.0000 0.1101 0.0000 0.0097 0.0000
B-7 0.0439 0.0012 0.0065 0.0000 0.1682 0.0000 0.0097 0.0000
B-8 0.0439 0.0012 0.0065 0.0000 0.1101 0.0000 0.0097 0.0000
B-9 0.0439 0.0012 0.0065 0.0000 0.1682 0.0000 0.0097 0.0000
B-10 0.0439 0.0012 0.0065 0.0000 0.1101 0.0000 0.0097 0.0000
B-11 0.0439 0.0012 0.0065 0.0000 0.1682 0.0010 0.0097 0.0000
B-12 0.0439 0.0012 0.0065 0.0000 0.1682 0.0000 0.0097 0.0000
B-13 0.0439 0.0012 0.0169 0.0204 0.1682 0.0010 0.0097 0.0039
B-14 0.0439 0.0012 0.0169 0.0204 0.1682 0.0010 0.0097 0.0039
B-15 0.0439 0.0012 0.0169 0.0204 0.1682 0.0010 0.0097 0.0039
B-16 0.0171 0.0012 0.0065 0.0000 0.1101 0.0000 0.0097 0.0000
B-17 0.0918 0.0012 0.0169 0.0204 0.1682 0.0030 0.0097 0.0039
B-18 0.0439 0.0012 0.0169 0.0204 0.1682 0.0010 0.0097 0.0000
B-19 0.0439 0.0012 0.0065 0.0000 0.1101 0.0000 0.0097 0.0039
B-20 0.0918 0.0012 0.0169 0.0204 0.1682 0.0030 0.0097 0.0039
B-21 0.0439 0.0012 0.0065 0.0000 0.1682 0.0000 0.0097 0.0000
B-22 0.0439 0.0012 0.0065 0.0000 0.1682 0.0000 0.0097 0.0000
B-23 0.0439 0.0012 0.0169 0.0204 0.1682 0.0010 0.0097 0.0000
B-24 0.0439 0.0012 0.0169 0.0204 0.1682 0.0010 0.0097 0.0000
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E.3 Stakeholder S-3
Anhn onc S etebr20
Economics Image Health & Safety Environment
C t Lost General UtilityComponent Lost Repair Public Political Customers Genep l r FaunaRevenue Public Worker
T-1 0.0087 0.0008 0.0050 0.0000 0.0055 0.0000 0.0175 0.0000
T-2 0.0087 0.0008 0.0050 0.0000 0.0055 0.0000 0.0175 0.0000
T-3 0.0087 0.0008 0.0050 0.0000 0.0055 0.0000 0.0175 0.0000
T-4 0.0087 0.0008 0.0050 0.0000 0.0055 0.0000 0.0175 0.0000
T-5 0.0087 0.0008 0.0050 0.0000 0.0085 0.0000 0.0175 0.0000
T-6 0.0087 0.0008 0.0050 0.0000 0.0055 0.0000 0.0175 0.0000
T-7 0.0266 0.0008 0.0129 0.0169 0.0085 0.0000 0.0175 0.0202
T-8 0.0087 0.0008 0.0050 0.0000 0.0085 0.0000 0.0175 0.0000
T-9 0.0087 0.0008 0.0050 0.0000 0.0055 0.0000 0.0175 0.0000
T-10 0.0034 0.0008 0.0050 0.0000 0.0055 0.0000 0.0175 0.0000
T-11 0.0000 0.0008 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0175 0.0000
T-12 0.0087 0.0008 0.0050 0.0000 0.0055 0.0000 0.0175 0.0000
T-13 0.0087 0.0008 0.0129 0.0169 0.0085 0.0092 0.0175 0.0202
T-14 0.0181 0.0008 0.0050 0.0169 0.0085 0.0000 0.0175 0.0202
T-15 0.0181 0.0008 0.0050 0.0169 0.0085 0.0000 0.0175 0.0202
T-16 0.0266 0.0008 0.0129 0.0380 0.0167 0.0269 0.0175 0.0837
T-17 0.0266 0.0008 0.0129 0.0380 0.0167 0.0269 0.0175 0.0837
T-18 0.0087 0.0008 0.0050 0.0000 0.0055 0.0000 0.0175 0.0000
T-19 0.0087 0.0008 0.0050 0.0000 0.0055 0.0000 0.0175 0.0000
T-20 0.0087 0.0008 0.0050 0.0000 0.0055 0.0000 0.0175 0.0000
T-21 0.0087 0.0008 0.0050 0.0000 0.0055 0.0000 0.0175 0.0000
T-22 0.0000 0.0008 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0175 0.0000
T-23 0.0087 0.0008 0.0050 0.0000 0.0085 0.0000 0.0175 0.0000
T-24 0.0087 0.0008 0.0050 0.0000 0.0055 0.0000 0.0175 0.0000
T-25-1 0.0087 0.0008 0.0050 0.0000 0.0055 0.0000 0.0175 0.0000
T-25-2 0.0087 0.0008 0.0050 0.0000 0.0055 0.0000 0.0175 0.0000
T-26 0.0087 0.0008 0.0050 0.0000 0.0055 0.0000 0.0175 0.0000
T-27 0.0087 0.0008 0.0050 0.0000 0.0055 0.0000 0.0175 0.0000
T-28 0.0000 0.0008 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0175 0.0000
T-29 0.0087 0.0008 0.0050 0.0000 0.0055 0.0000 0.0175 0.0000
T-30 0.0087 0.0008 0.0050 0.0000 0.0055 0.0000 0.0175 0.0000
T-31-1 0.0087 0.0008 0.0050 0.0000 0.0055 0.0000 0.0175 0.0000
T-31-2 0.0087 0.0008 0.0050 0.0000 0.0055 0.0000 0.0175 0.0000
T-32-1 0.0087 0.0008 0.0050 0.0000 0.0055 0.0000 0.0175 0.0000
T-32-2 0.0087 0.0008 0.0050 0.0000 0.0055 0.0000 0.0175 0.0000
T-33-1 0.0087 0.0008 0.0050 0.0000 0.0055 0.0000 0.0175 0.0000
T-33-2 0.0087 0.0008 0.0050 0.0000 0.0055 0.0000 0.0175 0.0000
T-34 0.0087 0.0008 0.0050 0.0000 0.0055 0.0000 0.0175 0.0000
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Economics Image Health & Safety Environment
Component Lost Repair Public Political Customers General Utility FaunaRevenue Public Worker
G-1 0.0181 0.0008 0.0050 0.0000 0.0085 0.0000 0.0175 0.0000
G-2 0.0087 0.0008 0.0050 0.0000 0.0085 0.0000 0.0175 0.0000
G-7 0.0087 0.0008 0.0050 0.0000 0.0055 0.0000 0.0175 0.0000
G-13 0.0181 0.0008 0.0129 0.0380 0.0167 0.0269 0.0175 0.0837
G-15 0.0181 0.0008 0.0050 0.0000 0.0085 0.0000 0.0175 0.0000
G-16 0.0181 0.0008 0.0050 0.0000 0.0085 0.0000 0.0175 0.0000
G-18 0.0181 0.0008 0.0129 0.0169 0.0085 0.0092 0.0175 0.0202
G-21 0.0181 0.0008 0.0129 0.0169 0.0085 0.0092 0.0175 0.0202
G-22 0.0087 0.0008 0.0050 0.0000 0.0085 0.0000 0.0175 0.0000
G-23 0.0181 0.0008 0.0129 0.0169 0.0085 0.0000 0.0175 0.0202
B-1 0.0087 0.0004 0.0050 0.0000 0.0085 0.0000 0.0175 0.0000
B-2 0.0087 0.0004 0.0050 0.0000 0.0085 0.0000 0.0175 0.0000
B-3 0.0087 0.0004 0.0129 0.0169 0.0085 0.0092 0.0175 0.0202
B-4 0.0087 0.0004 0.0129 0.0169 0.0085 0.0092 0.0175 0.0202
B-5 0.0087 0.0004 0.0050 0.0000 0.0085 0.0000 0.0175 0.0000
B-6 0.0087 0.0004 0.0050 0.0000 0.0055 0.0000 0.0175 0.0000
B-7 0.0087 0.0004 0.0050 0.0000 0.0085 0.0000 0.0175 0.0000
B-8 0.0087 0.0004 0.0050 0.0000 0.0055 0.0000 0.0175 0.0000
B-9 0.0087 0.0004 0.0050 0.0000 0.0085 0.0000 0.0175 0.0000
B-10 0.0087 0.0004 0.0050 0.0000 0.0055 0.0000 0.0175 0.0000
B-11 0.0087 0.0004 0.0050 0.0000 0.0085 0.0092 0.0175 0.0000
B-12 0.0087 0.0004 0.0050 0.0000 0.0085 0.0000 0.0175 0.0000
B-13 0.0087 0.0004 0.0129 0.0169 0.0085 0.0092 0.0175 0.0202
B-14 0.0087 0.0004 0.0129 0.0169 0.0085 0.0092 0.0175 0.0202
B-15 0.0087 0.0004 0.0129 0.0169 0.0085 0.0092 0.0175 0.0202
B-16 0.0034 0.0004 0.0050 0.0000 0.0055 0.0000 0.0175 0.0000
B-17 0.0181 0.0004 0.0129 0.0169 0.0085 0.0269 0.0175 0.0202
B-18 0.0087 0.0004 0.0129 0.0169 0.0085 0.0092 0.0175 0.0000
B-19 0.0087 0.0004 0.0050 0.0000 0.0055 0.0000 0.0175 0.0202
B-20 0.0181 0.0004 0.0129 0.0169 0.0085 0.0269 0.0175 0.0202
B-21 0.0087 0.0004 0.0050 0.0000 0.0085 0.0000 0.0175 0.0000
B-22 0.0087 0.0004 0.0050 0.0000 0.0085 0.0000 0.0175 0.0000
B-23 0.0087 0.0004 0.0129 0.0169 0.0085 0.0092 0.0175 0.0000
B-24 0.0087 0.0004 0.0129 0.0169 0.0085 0.0092 0.0175 0.0000
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E.4 Stakeholder S-4
Economics Image Health & Safety Environment
Lost General Utility FaunaComponent Revenue Repair Public Political Customers blic Worker FaunaRevenue Public Worker
T-1 0.0160 0.0012 0.0014 0.0000 0.0009 0.0000 0.0073 0.0000
T-2 0.0160 0.0012 0.0014 0.0000 0.0009 0.0000 0.0073 0.0000
T-3 0.0160 0.0012 0.0014 0.0000 0.0009 0.0000 0.0073 0.0000
T-4 0.0160 0.0012 0.0014 0.0000 0.0009 0.0000 0.0073 0.0000
T-5 0.0160 0.0012 0.0014 0.0000 0.0014 0.0000 0.0073 0.0000
T-6 0.0160 0.0012 0.0014 0.0000 0.0009 0.0000 0.0073 0.0000
T-7 0.0490 0.0012 0.0038 0.0048 0.0014 0.0000 0.0073 0.0231
T-8 0.0160 0.0012 0.0014 0.0000 0.0014 0.0000 0.0073 0.0000
T-9 0.0160 0.0012 0.0014 0.0000 0.0009 0.0000 0.0073 0.0000
T-10 0.0062 0.0012 0.0014 0.0000 0.0009 0.0000 0.0073 0.0000
T-11 0.0000 0.0012 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0073 0.0000
T-12 0.0160 0.0012 0.0014 0.0000 0.0009 0.0000 0.0073 0.0000
T-13 0.0160 0.0012 0.0038 0.0048 0.0014 0.0152 0.0073 0.0231
T-14 0.0334 0.0012 0.0014 0.0048 0.0014 0.0000 0.0073 0.0231
T-15 0.0334 0.0012 0.0014 0.0048 0.0014 0.0000 0.0073 0.0231
T-16 0.0490 0.0012 0.0038 0.0108 0.0028 0.0447 0.0073 0.0957
T-17 0.0490 0.0012 0.0038 0.0108 0.0028 0.0447 0.0073 0.0957
T-18 0.0160 0.0012 0.0014 0.0000 0.0009 0.0000 0.0073 0.0000
T-19 0.0160 0.0012 0.0014 0.0000 0.0009 0.0000 0.0073 0.0000
T-20 0.0160 0.0012 0.0014 0.0000 0.0009 0.0000 0.0073 0.0000
T-21 0.0160 0.0012 0.0014 0.0000 0.0009 0.0000 0.0073 0.0000
T-22 0.0000 0.0012 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0073 0.0000
T-23 0.0160 0.0012 0.0014 0.0000 0.0014 0.0000 0.0073 0.0000
T-24 0.0160 0.0012 0.0014 0.0000 0.0009 0.0000 0.0073 0.0000
T-25-1 0.0160 0.0012 0.0014 0.0000 0.0009 0.0000 0.0073 0.0000
T-25-2 0.0160 0.0012 0.0014 0.0000 0.0009 0.0000 0.0073 0.0000
T-26 0.0160 0.0012 0.0014 0.0000 0.0009 0.0000 0.0073 0.0000
T-27 0.0160 0.0012 0.0014 0.0000 0.0009 0.0000 0.0073 0.0000
T-28 0.0000 0.0012 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0073 0.0000
T-29 0.0160 0.0012 0.0014 0.0000 0.0009 0.0000 0.0073 0.0000
T-30 0.0160 0.0012 0.0014 0.0000 0.0009 0.0000 0.0073 0.0000
T-31-1 0.0160 0.0012 0.0014 0.0000 0.0009 0.0000 0.0073 0.0000
T-31-2 0.0160 0.0012 0.0014 0.0000 0.0009 0.0000 0.0073 0.0000
T-32-1 0.0160 0.0012 0.0014 0.0000 0.0009 0.0000 0.0073 0.0000
T-32-2 0.0160 0.0012 0.0014 0.0000 0.0009 0.0000 0.0073 0.0000
T-33-1 0.0160 0.0012 0.0014 0.0000 0.0009 0.0000 0.0073 0.0000
T-33-2 0.0160 0.0012 0.0014 0.0000 0.0009 0.0000 0.0073 0.0000
T-34 0.0160 0.0012 0.0014 0.0000 0.0009 0.0000 0.0073 0.0000
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Economics Image Health & Safety Environment
Component Revenue Repair Public Political Customers GPublc Workertility Fauna
G-1 0.0334 0.0012 0.0014 0.0000 0.0014 0.0000 0.0073 0.0000
G-2 0.0160 0.0012 0.0014 0.0000 0.0014 0.0000 0.0073 0.0000
G-7 0.0160 0.0012 0.0014 0.0000 0.0009 0.0000 0.0073 0.0000
G-13 0.0334 0.0012 0.0038 0.0108 0.0028 0.0447 0.0073 0.0957
G-15 0.0334 0.0012 0.0014 0.0000 0.0014 0.0000 0.0073 0.0000
G-16 0.0334 0.0012 0.0014 0.0000 0.0014 0.0000 0.0073 0.0000
G-18 0.0334 0.0012 0.0038 0.0048 0.0014 0.0152 0.0073 0.0231
G-21 0.0334 0.0012 0.0038 0.0048 0.0014 0.0152 0.0073 0.0231
G-22 0.0160 0.0012 0.0014 0.0000 0.0014 0.0000 0.0073 0.0000
G-23 0.0334 0.0012 0.0038 0.0048 0.0014 0.0000 0.0073 0.0231
B-1 0.0160 0.0006 0.0014 0.0000 0.0014 0.0000 0.0073 0.0000
B-2 0.0160 0.0006 0.0014 0.0000 0.0014 0.0000 0.0073 0.0000
B-3 0.0160 0.0006 0.0038 0.0048 0.0014 0.0152 0.0073 0.0231
B-4 0.0160 0.0006 0.0038 0.0048 0.0014 0.0152 0.0073 0.0231
B-5 0.0160 0.0006 0.0014 0.0000 0.0014 0.0000 0.0073 0.0000
B-6 0.0160 0.0006 0.0014 0.0000 0.0009 0.0000 0.0073 0.0000
B-7 0.0160 0.0006 0.0014 0.0000 0.0014 0.0000 0.0073 0.0000
B-8 0.0160 0.0006 0.0014 0.0000 0.0009 0.0000 0.0073 0.0000
B-9 0.0160 0.0006 0.0014 0.0000 0.0014 0.0000 0.0073 0.0000
B-10 0.0160 0.0006 0.0014 0.0000 0.0009 • 0.0000 0.0073 0.0000
B-11 0.0160 0.0006 0.0014 0.0000 0.0014 0.0152 0.0073 0.0000
B-12 0.0160 0.0006 0.0014 0.0000 0.0014 0.0000 0.0073 0.0000
B-13 0.0160 0.0006 0.0038 0.0048 0.0014 0.0152 0.0073 0.0231
B-14 0.0160 0.0006 0.0038 0.0048 0.0014 0.0152 0.0073 0.0231
B-15 0.0160 0.0006 0.0038 0.0048 0.0014 0.0152 0.0073 0.0231
B-16 0.0062 0.0006 0.0014 0.0000 0.0009 0.0000 0.0073 0.0000
B-17 0.0334 0.0006 0.0038 0.0048 0.0014 0.0447 0.0073 0.0231
B-18 0.0160 0.0006 0.0038 0.0048 0.0014 0.0152 0.0073 0.0000
B-19 0.0160 0.0006 0.0014 0.0000 0.0009 0.0000 0.0073 0.0231
B-20 0.0334 0.0006 0.0038 0.0048 0.0014 0.0447 0.0073 0.0231
B-21 0.0160 0.0006 0.0014 0.0000 0.0014 0.0000 0.0073 0.0000
B-22 0.0160 0.0006 0.0014 0.0000 0.0014 0.0000 0.0073 0.0000
B-23 0.0160 0.0006 0.0038 0.0048 0.0014 0.0152 0.0073 0.0000
B-24 0.0160 0.0006 0.0038 0.0048 0.0014 0.0152 0.0073 0.0000
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E.5 Stakeholder S-5
Economics Image Health & Safety Environment
Lost General UtilityComponent Revenue Repair Public Political Customers Public Worker FaunaRevenue Public Worker
T-1 0.0263 0.0034 0.0019 0.0000 0.0010 0.0000 0.0230 0.0000
T-2 0.0263 0.0034 0.0019 0.0000 0.0010 0.0000 0.0230 0.0000
T-3 0.0263 0.0034 0.0019 0.0000 0.0010 0.0000 0.0230 0.0000
T-4 0.0263 0.0034 0.0019 0.0000 0.0010 0.0000 0.0230 0.0000
T-5 0.0263 0.0034 0.0019 0.0000 0.0015 0.0000 0.0230 0.0000
T-6 0.0263 0.0034 0.0019 0.0000 0.0010 0.0000 0.0230 0.0000
T-7 0.0808 0.0034 0.0049 0.0048 0.0015 0.0000 0.0230 0.0074
T-8 0.0263 0.0034 0.0019 0.0000 0.0015 0.0000 0.0230 0.0000
T-9 0.0263 0.0034 0.0019 0.0000 0.0010 0.0000 0.0230 0.0000
T-10 0.0103 0.0034 0.0019 0.0000 0.0010 0.0000 0.0230 0.0000
T-11 0.0000 0.0034 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0230 0.0000
T-12 0.0263 0.0034 0.0019 0.0000 0.0010 0.0000 0.0230 0.0000
T-13 0.0263 0.0034 0.0049 0.0048 0.0015 0.0120 0.0230 0.0074
T-14 0.0550 0.0034 0.0019 0.0048 0.0015 0.0000 0.0230 0.0074
T-15 0.0550 0.0034 0.0019 0.0048 0.0015 0.0000 0.0230 0.0074
T-16 0.0808 0.0034 0.0049 0.0107 0.0029 0.0353 0.0230 0.0306
T-17 0.0808 0.0034 0.0049 0.0107 0.0029 0.0353 0.0230 0.0306
T-18 0.0263 0.0034 0.0019 0.0000 0.0010 0.0000 0.0230 0.0000
T-19 0.0263 0.0034 0.0019 0.0000 0.0010 0.0000 0.0230 0.0000
T-20 0.0263 0.0034 0.0019 0.0000 0.0010 0.0000 0.0230 0.0000
T-21 0.0263 0.0034 0.0019 0.0000 0.0010 0.0000 0.0230 0.0000
T-22 0.0000 0.0034 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0230 0.0000
T-23 0.0263 0.0034 0.0019 0.0000 0.0015 0.0000 0.0230 0.0000
T-24 0.0263 0.0034 0.0019 0.0000 0.0010 0.0000 0.0230 0.0000
T-25-1 0.0263 0.0034 0.0019 0.0000 0.0010 0.0000 0.0230 0.0000
T-25-2 0.0263 0.0034 0.0019 0.0000 0.0010 0.0000 0.0230 0.0000
T-26 0.0263 0.0034 0.0019 0.0000 0.0010 0.0000 0.0230 0.0000
T-27 0.0263 0.0034 0.0019 0.0000 0.0010 0.0000 0.0230 0.0000
T-28 0.0000 0.0034 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0230 0.0000
T-29 0.0263 0.0034 0.0019 0.0000 0.0010 0.0000 0.0230 0.0000
T-30 0.0263 0.0034 0.0019 0.0000 0.0010 0.0000 0.0230 0.0000
T-31-1 0.0263 0.0034 0.0019 0.0000 0.0010 0.0000 0.0230 0.0000
T-31-2 0.0263 0.0034 0.0019 0.0000 0.0010 0.0000 0.0230 0.0000
T-32-1 0.0263 0.0034 0.0019 0.0000 0.0010 0.0000 0.0230 0.0000
T-32-2 0.0263 0.0034 0.0019 0.0000 0.0010 0.0000 0.0230 0.0000
T-33-1 0.0263 0.0034 0.0019 0.0000 0.0010 0.0000 0.0230 0.0000
T-33-2 0.0263 0.0034 0.0019 0.0000 0.0010 0.0000 0.0230 0.0000
T-34 0.0263 0.0034 0.0019 0.0000 0.0010 0.0000 0.0230 0.0000
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Economics Image Health & Safety Environment
Lost General Utility
Component Revenue Repair Public Political Customers General Fauna
G-1 0.0550 0.0034 0.0019 0.0000 0.0015 0.0000 0.0230 0.0000
G-2 0.0263 0.0034 0.0019 0.0000 0.0015 0.0000 0.0230 0.0000
G-7 0.0263 0.0034 0.0019 0.0000 0.0010 0.0000 0.0230 0.0000
G-13 0.0550 0.0034 0.0049 0.0107 0.0029 0.0353 0.0230 0.0306
G-15 0.0550 0.0034 0.0019 0.0000 0.0015 0.0000 0.0230 0.0000
G-16 0.0550 0.0034 0.0019 0.0000 0.0015 0.0000 0.0230 0.0000
G-18 0.0550 0.0034 0.0049 0.0048 0.0015 0.0120 0.0230 0.0074
G-21 0.0550 0.0034 0.0049 0.0048 0.0015 0.0120 0.0230 0.0074
G-22 0.0263 0.0034 0.0019 0.0000 0.0015 0.0000 0.0230 0.0000
G-23 0.0550 0.0034 0.0049 0.0048 0.0015 0.0000 0.0230 0.0074
B-1 0.0263 0.0017 0.0019 0.0000 0.0015 0.0000 0.0230 0.0000
B-2 0.0263 0.0017 0.0019 0.0000 0.0015 0.0000 0.0230 0.0000
B-3 0.0263 0.0017 0.0049 0.0048 0.0015 0.0120 0.0230 0.0074
B-4 0.0263 0.0017 0.0049 0.0048 0.0015 0.0120 0.0230 0.0074
B-5 0.0263 0.0017 0.0019 0.0000 0.0015 0.0000 0.0230 0.0000
B-6 0.0263 0.0017 0.0019 0.0000 0.0010 0.0000 0.0230 0.0000
B-7 0.0263 0.0017 0.0019 0.0000 0.0015 0.0000 0.0230 0.0000
B-8 0.0263 0.0017 0.0019 0.0000 0.0010 0.0000 0.0230 0.0000
B-9 0.0263 0.0017 0.0019 0.0000 0.0015 0.0000 0.0230 0.0000
B-10 0.0263 0.0017 0.0019 0.0000 0.0010 0.0000 0.0230 0.0000
B-11 0.0263 0.0017 0.0019 0.0000 0.0015 0.0120 0.0230 0.0000
B-12 0.0263 0.0017 0.0019 0.0000 0.0015 0.0000 0.0230 0.0000
B-13 0.0263 0.0017 0.0049 0.0048 0.0015 0.0120 0.0230 0.0074
B-14 0.0263 0.0017 0.0049 0.0048 0.0015 0.0120 0.0230 0.0074
B-15 0.0263 0.0017 0.0049 0.0048 0.0015 0.0120 0.0230 0.0074
B-16 0.0103 0.0017 0.0019 0.0000 0.0010 0.0000 0.0230 0.0000
B-17 0.0550 0.0017 0.0049 0.0048 0.0015 0.0353 0.0230 0.0074
B-18 0.0263 0.0017 0.0049 0.0048 0.0015 0.0120 0.0230 0.0000
B-19 0.0263 0.0017 0.0019 0.0000 0.0010 0.0000 0.0230 0.0074
B-20 0.0550 0.0017 0.0049 0.0048 0.0015 0.0353 0.0230 0.0074
B-21 0.0263 0.0017 0.0019 0.0000 0.0015 0.0000 0.0230 0.0000
B-22 0.0263 0.0017 0.0019 0.0000 0.0015 0.0000 0.0230 0.0000
B-23 0.0263 0.0017 0.0049 0.0048 0.0015 0.0120 0.0230 0.0000
B-24 0.0263 0.0017 0.0049 0.0048 0.0015 0.0120 0.0230 0.0000
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F. Component Risk-Significance by Stakeholder
F.1 Stakeholder S-1
Vulnerability Vulnerability
Component PI Exp PI Level Component PI Exp P Level
T-1 0.0883 0.0212 O G-1 0.1457 0.0029 B
T-2 0.0883 0.0451 O G-2 0.1055 0.0021 B
T-3 0.0883 0.0292 O G-7 0.0883 0.0035 B
T-4 0.0883 0.0345 O G-13 0.3660 0.0183 Y
T-5 0.1055 0.0506 O G-15 0.1457 0.0058 B
T-6 0.0883 0.0336 O G-16 0.1457 0.0058 B
T-7 0.2583 0.0052 O G-18 0.2235 0.0268 B
T-8 0.1055 0.0380 0 G-21 0.2235 0.0268 B
T-9 0.0883 0.0300 O G-22 0.1055 0.0011 B
T-10 0.0659 0.0217 Y G-23 0.2223 0.0089 B
T-11 0.0118 0.0035 B
T-12 0.0883 0.0389 O B-1 0.1042 0.0010 O
T-13 0.1833 0.0806 O B-2 0.1042 0.0010 O
T-14 0.2107 0.0042 O B-3 0.1820 0.0018 O
T-15 0.2107 0.0042 O B-4 0.1820 0.0018 O
T-16 0.4021 0.0080 O B-5 0.1042 0.0010 O
T-17 0.4021 0.0080 O B-6 0.0871 0.0009 Y
T-18 0.0883 0.0353 O B-7 0.1042 0.0010 O
T-19 0.0883 0.0345 O B-8 0.0871 0.0009 Y
T-20 0.0883 0.0353 O B-9 0.1042 0.0010 O
T-21 0.0883 0.0459 O B-10 0.0871 0.0009 Y
T-22 0.0118 0.0058 B B-11 0.1055 0.0011 O
T-23 0.1055 0.0401 0 B-12 0.1042 0.0010 O
T-24 0.0883 0.0292 O B-13 0.1820 0.0018 O
T-25-1 0.0883 0.0362 O B-14 0.1820 0.0018 O
T-25-2 0.0883 0.0362 O B-15 0.1820 0.0018 O
T-26 0.0883 0.0362 O B-16 0.0646 0.0006 Y
T-27 0.0883 0.0309 O B-17 0.2246 0.0022 O
T-28 0.0118 0.0040 B B-18 0.1763 0.0018 O
T-29 0.0883 0.0283 O B-19 0.0928 0.0009 Y
T-30 0.0883 0.0477 O B-20 0.2246 0.0022 O
T-31-1 0.0883 0.0309 O B-21 0.1042 0.0010 O
T-31-2 0.0883 0.0309 O B-22 0.1042 0.0010 O
T-32-1 0.0883 0.0336 O B-23 0.1763 0.0018 O
T-32-2 0.0883 0.0336 O B-24 0.1763 0.0018 O
T-33-1 0.0883 0.0300 O
T-33-2 0.0883 0.0300 O
T-34 0.0883 0.0398 O
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F.2 Stakeholder S-2
Component PI Exp PI Vulnerability Component PI Exp PI VulnerabilityLevel Level
T-1 0.1726 0.0414 O G-1 0.2787 0.0056 Y
T-2 0.1726 0.0880 O G-2 0.2307 0.0046 Y
T-3 0.1726 0.0570 O G-7 0.1726 0.0069 Y
T-4 0.1726 0.0673 O G-13 0.5177 0.0259 Y
T-5 0.2307 0.1108 O G-15 0.2787 0.0111 Y
T-6 0.1726 0.0656 O G-16 0.2787 0.0111 Y
T-7 0.3563 0.0071 R G-18 0.3143 0.0377 Y
T-8 0.2307 0.0831 O G-21 0.3143 0.0377 Y
T-9 0.1726 0.0587 O G-22 0.2307 0.0023 Y
T-10 0.1458 0.0481 O G-23 0.3133 0.0125 Y
T-11 0.0121 0.0036 B
T-12 0.1726 0.0759 O B-1 0.2295 0.0023 O
T-13 0.2664 0.1172 R B-2 0.2295 0.0023 O
T-14 0.3030 0.0061 R B-3 0.2651 0.0027 O
T-15 0.3030 0.0061 R B-4 0.2651 0.0027 O
T-16 0.5607 0.0112 R B-5 0.2295 0.0023 O
T-17 0.5607 0.0112 R B-6 0.1713 0.0017 O
T-18 0.1726 0.0690 O B-7 0.2295 0.0023 O
T-19 0.1726 0.0673 O B-8 0.1713 0.0017 O
T-20 0.1726 0.0690 O B-9 0.2295 0.0023 O
T-21 0.1726 0.0898 O B-10 0.1713 0.0017 O
T-22 0.0121 0.0059 B B-11 0.2305 0.0023 O
T-23 0.2307 0.0877 O B-12 0.2295 0.0023 O
T-24 0.1726 0.0570 O B-13 0.2651 0.0027 O
T-25-1 0.1726 0.0708 O B-14 0.2651 0.0027 O
T-25-2 0.1726 0.0708 O B-15 0.2651 0.0027 O
T-26 0.1726 0.0708 O B-16 0.1446 0.0014 O
T-27 0.1726 0.0604 O B-17 0.3150 0.0032 O
T-28 0.0121 0.0041 B B-18 0.2612 0.0026 O
T-29 0.1726 0.0552 O B-19 0.1753 0.0018 O
T-30 0.1726 0.0932 O B-20 0.3150 0.0032 O
T-31-1 0.1726 0.0604 O B-21 0.2295 0.0023 O
T-31-2 0.1726 0.0604 O B-22 0.2295 0.0023 O
T-32-1 0.1726 0.0656 O B-23 0.2612 0.0026 O
T-32-2 0.1726 0.0656 O B-24 0.2612 0.0026 O
T-33-1 0.1726 0.0587 O
T-33-2 0.1726 0.0587 O
T-34 0.1726 0.0777 O
Anthony Koonce NSE 
September '2UU~September 2000NSE
Appendix F
F.3 Stakeholder S-3
Vulnerability Vulnerability
Component PI Exp PI Level Compoent PI ExpPI Level
T-1 0.0375 0.0090 Y G-1 0.0499 0.0010 G
T-2 0.0375 0.0191 Y G-2 0.0405 0.0008 G
T-3 0.0375 0.0124 Y G-7 0.0375 0.0015 G
T-4 0.0375 0.0146 Y G-13 0.2148 0.0107 Y
T-5 0.0405 0.0194 Y G-15 0.0499 0.0020 G
T-6 0.0375 0.0143 Y G-16 0.0499 0.0020 G
T-7 0.1034 0.0021 O G-18 0.1041 0.0125 Y
T-8 0.0405 0.0146 Y G-21 0.1041 0.0125 Y
T-9 0.0375 0.0128 Y G-22 0.0405 0.0004 G
T-10 0.0323 0.0106 Y G-23 0.0950 0.0038 B
T-11 0.0184 0.0055 B
T-12 0.0375 0.0165 Y B-1 0.0400 0.0004 Y
T-13 0.0947 0.0417 O B-2 0.0400 0.0004 Y
T-14 0.0870 0.0017 O B-3 0.0942 0.0009 Y
T-15 0.0870 0.0017 O B-4 0.0942 0.0009 Y
T-16 0.2232 0.0045 O B-5 0.0400 0.0004 Y
T-17 0.2232 0.0045 O B-6 0.0371 0.0004 Y
T-18 0.0375 0.0150 Y B-7 0.0400 0.0004 Y
T-19 0.0375 0.0146 Y B-8 0.0371 0.0004 Y
T-20 0.0375 0.0150 Y B-9 0.0400 0.0004 Y
T-21 0.0375 0.0195 Y B-10 0.0371 0.0004 Y
T-22 0.0184 0.0090 B B-11 0.0492 0.0005 Y
T-23 0.0405 0.0154 Y B-12 0.0400 0.0004 Y
T-24 0.0375 0.0124 Y B-13 0.0942 0.0009 Y
T-25-1 0.0375 0.0154 Y B-14 0.0942 0.0009 Y
T-25-2 0.0375 0.0154 Y B-15 0.0942 0.0009 Y
T-26 0.0375 0.0154 Y B-16 0.0318 0.0003 Y
T-27 0.0375 0.0131 Y B-17 0.1215 0.0012 O
T-28 0.0184 0.0062 B B-18 0.0740 0.0007 Y
T-29 0.0375 0.0120 Y B-19 0.0573 0.0006 Y
T-30 0.0375 0.0203 Y B-20 0.1215 0.0012 O
T-31-1 0.0375 0.0131 Y B-21 0.0400 0.0004 Y
T-31-2 0.0375 0.0131 Y B-22 0.0400 0.0004 Y
T-32-1 0.0375 0.0143 Y B-23 0.0740 0.0007 Y
T-32-2 0.0375 0.0143 Y B-24 0.0740 0.0007 Y
T-33-1 0.0375 0.0128 Y
T-33-2 0.0375 0.0128 Y
T-34 0.0375 0.0169 Y
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Appendix F
F.4 Stakeholder S-4
Component PI Exp PI Vulneraponent PI Exp PI VulnerabilityLevel ___Level
T-1 0.0268 0.0064 B G-1 0.0448 0.0009 B
T-2 0.0268 0.0137 B G-2 0.0273 0.0005 B
T-3 0.0268 0.0089 B G-7 0.0268 0.0011 B
T-4 0.0268 0.0105 B G-13 0.1997 0.0100 Y
T-5 0.0273 0.0131 B G-15 0.0448 0.0018 B
T-6 0.0268 0.0102 B G-16 0.0448 0.0018 B
T-7 0.0906 0.0018 O G-18 0.0902 0.0108 B
T-8 0.0273 0.0098 B G-21 0.0902 0.0108 B
T-9 0.0268 0.0091 B G-22 0.0273 0.0003 B
T-10 0.0171 0.0056 B G-23 0.0750 0.0030 B
T-11 0.0085 0.0026 B
T-12 0.0268 0.0118 B B-1 0.0267 0.0003 B
T-13 0.0728 0.0320 O B-2 0.0267 0.0003 B
T-14 0.0727 0.0015 O B-3 0.0721 0.0007 Y
T-15 0.0727 0.0015 O B-4 0.0721 0.0007 Y
T-16 0.2153 0.0043 0 B-5 0.0267 0.0003 B
T-17 0.2153 0.0043 O B-6 0.0262 0.0003 B
T-18 0.0268 0.0107 B B-7 0.0267 0.0003 B
T-19 0.0268 0.0105 B B-8 0.0262 0.0003 B
T-20 0.0268 0.0107 B B-9 0.0267 0.0003 B
T-21 0.0268 0.0140 B B-10 0.0262 0.0003 B
T-22 0.0085 0.0042 B B-11 0.0419 0.0004 Y
T-23 0.0273 0.0104 B B-12 0.0267 0.0003 B
T-24 0.0268 0.0089 B B-13 0.0721 0.0007 Y
T-25-1 0.0268 0.0110 B B-14 0.0721 0.0007 Y
T-25-2 0.0268 0.0110 B B-15 0.0721 0.0007 Y
T-26 0.0268 0.0110 B B-16 0.0165 0.0002 B
T-27 0.0268 0.0094 B B-17 0.1190 0.0012 O
T-28 0.0085 0.0029 B B-18 0.0490 0.0005 Y
T-29 0.0268 0.0086 B B-19 0.0493 0.0005 Y
T-30 0.0268 0.0145 B B-20 0.1190 0.0012 O
T-31-1 0.0268 0.0094 B B-21 0.0267 0.0003 B
T-31-2 0.0268 0.0094 B B-22 0.0267 0.0003 B
T-32-1 0.0268 0.0102 B B-23 0.0490 0.0005 Y
T-32-2 0.0268 0.0102 B B-24 0.0490 0.0005 Y
T-33-1 0.0268 0.0091 B
T-33-2 0.0268 0.0091 B
T-34 0.0268 0.0121 B
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Appendix F
F.5 Stakeholder S-5
Vulnerability VulnerabilityComponent PI Exp PI Vulnerability Component PI Exp PI VulnerabilityLevel Level
T-1 0.0556 0.0133 O G-1 0.0848 0.0017 Y
T-2 0.0556 0.0283 O G-2 0.0561 0.0011 Y
T-3 0.0556 0.0183 O G-7 0.0556 0.0022 Y
T-4 0.0556 0.0217 O G-13 0.1659 0.0083 Y
T-5 0.0561 0.0269 O G-15 0.0848 0.0034 Y
T-6 0.0556 0.0211 O G-16 0.0848 0.0034 Y
T-7 0.1257 0.0025 O G-18 0.1120 0.0134 Y
T-8 0.0561 0.0202 O G-21 0.1120 0.0134 Y
T-9 0.0556 0.0189 O G-22 0.0561 0.0006 Y
T-10 0.0395 0.0130 Y G-23 0.1000 0.0040 Y
T-11 0.0264 0.0079 B
T-12 0.0556 0.0244 O B-1 0.0543 0.0005 Y
T-13 0.0833 0.0366 O B-2 0.0543 0.0005 Y
T-14 0.0969 0.0019 O B-3 0.0815 0.0008 Y
T-15 0.0969 0.0019 O B-4 0.0815 0.0008 Y
T-16 0.1917 0.0038 O B-5 0.0543 0.0005 Y
T-17 0.1917 0.0038 O B-6 0.0538 0.0005 Y
T-18 0.0556 0.0222 O B-7 0.0543 0.0005 Y
T-19 0.0556 0.0217 O B-8 0.0538 0.0005 Y
T-20 0.0556 0.0222 O B-9 0.0543 0.0005 Y
T-21 0.0556 0.0289 O B-10 0.0538 0.0005 Y
T-22 0.0264 0.0129 B B-11 0.0663 0.0007 Y
T-23 0.0561 0.0213 O B-12 0.0543 0.0005 Y
T-24 0.0556 0.0183 O B-13 0.0815 0.0008 Y
T-25-1 0.0556 0.0228 O B-14 0.0815 0.0008 Y
T-25-2 0.0556 0.0228 O B-15 0.0815 0.0008 Y
T-26 0.0556 0.0228 O B-16 0.0378 0.0004 Y
T-27 0.0556 0.0194 O B-17 0.1336 0.0013 O
T-28 0.0264 0.0090 B B-18 0.0741 0.0007 Y
T-29 0.0556 0.0178 O B-19 0.0612 0.0006 Y
T-30 0.0556 0.0300 O B-20 0.1336 0.0013 O
T-31-1 0.0556 0.0194 O B-21 0.0543 0.0005 Y
T-31-2 0.0556 0.0194 O B-22 0.0543 0.0005 Y
T-32-1 0.0556 0.0211 O B-23 0.0741 0.0007 Y
T-32-2 0.0556 0.0211 O B-24 0.0741 0.0007 Y
T-33-1 0.0556 0.0189 O
T-33-2 0.0556 0.0189 O
T-34 0.0556 0.0250 O
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